# 1NC

## 1NC – Politics

#### Sanctions Considered early next week

Buel 12/5 (2013, Meredith, http://www.voanews.com/content/congress-considers-new-iran-sanctions/1804723.html)

WASHINGTON — As early as next week the U.S. Congress could approve tough new sanctions on Iran, a move the White House warns may undermine diplomatic efforts to curb the country’s controversial nuclear program. It was smiles in Geneva when U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and other foreign ministers congratulated each other over last month’s interim accord on Iran’s nuclear program. Tough economic sanctions drove Iran to the bargaining table. And now some members of Congress want to put even more economic pressure on Tehran by approving a new round of sanctions. “The Congress believes that sanctions, along with the threat of credible military force by the United States and Israel, has gotten us to this point, that if you back off now, you're sending the worst possible signals,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham. Some members of Congress are concerned the interim nuclear deal allows Iran to continue enriching uranium. The top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Bob Corker, says that’s a mistake. “I think enrichment for a country especially like Iran that is shown to have secret programs, has been seen to be a rogue nation, their ability to enrich really throws into disarray, if you will, all the other agreements that we're negotiating around the world,” he said. The Obama administration says new sanctions will violate the interim agreement with Iran and could possibly divide the U.S. from its international partners. President Barack Obama says more time is needed for diplomacy. “If it turns out six months from now that they are not serious, we can crank, we can dial those sanctions right back up," he said. The interim agreement calls for daily inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities. Former State Department adviser for non-proliferation Robert Einhorn says that is a must. “You can't base this on trust," he said. "You have to base it on strong monitoring measures, strong verification measures.” Once the interim accord is implemented, negotiators will have six months to hammer out a final agreement designed to guarantee Iran’s nuclear program can be used solely for peaceful purposes. Analysts like James Phillips of The Heritage Foundation remain skeptical. “As we have seen with Iran, it frequently has violated its own pledges in the past so this deal could go up in smoke in the course of the next six months,” he said. Next week Kerry is scheduled to testify before members of Congress in an effort to address concerns about the interim nuclear deal. He will try to convince members not to approve any new sanctions while negotiations with Iran are continuing.

#### The plan is a massive congressional fight that infects the legislative future of unrelated initiatives

LeoGrande ‘12

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Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action

#### Capital is key---its on the brink and failure risks middle east war

Merry 11/19 (Robert W. Merry is political editor of The National Interest and the author of books on American history and foreign policy, “Obama and Netanyahu Go to War,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/obama-netanyahu-go-war-9420?page=1)

President Obama finds himself in a weakened state. His health care law is sapping his political strength and generating intense anxiety among his Democratic troops in Congress. His performance rating is at an all-time low. His trust with the American people is deteriorating badly, as reflected in a recent Quinnipiac University poll. His political capital is ebbing. And into this dire political situation comes a new challenge that will test the president’s resolve and mettle in a big way. If he wants to save his high-stakes effort to foster a negotiated agreement with Iran over its nuclear program, he must take on, directly, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israel lobby in the United States. If he doesn’t, Congress will kill his effort; the opportunity to find a peaceful solution will be lost; and chances for war with Iran will rise ominously. Indeed, administration officials have warned that the current congressional push for new sanctions on Iran, in the midst of his delicate efforts, would constitute "a march to war."

#### Negotiations failure triggers military strikes and regional proliferation-causes escalatory wars and collapses the economy.

**Cordesman, CSIS, 2013**

(Anthony, “Negotiating with Iran: The Strategic Case for Pragmatism and Real Progress”, 9-23, <http://csis.org/publication/negotiating-iran-strategic-case-pragmatism-and-real-progress>, ldg)

Nevertheless, it makes no sense at all to reject Hassan Rouhani’s opening or condemn the Obama Administration’s response. Iran’s nuclear programs have moved to the point where it is extremely doubtful that there will be another chance to begin what may be a long and difficult process for all nations involved, and an attempt at resolution is far better than any of the real world alternatives. As long as any negotiations that follow are realistic in terms of their content, and do not endorse indefinite delay in a U.S. response while Iran’s nuclear programs move forward, they offer what will be the last real hope of avoiding preventive strikes or a process of containment that would lock the region into an Iranian-Israeli nuclear arms race, a probable Saudi effort to acquire its own nuclear weapons, and a U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. The Uncertain Outcome of Preventive Strikes The United States, Iran, and all the other nations involved need to be far more pragmatic about what will happen if time does run out and Iran does go nuclear. Iran may well face a series of preventive strikes – triggered by Israel or planned by the United States – that will destroy far more than its nuclear facilities. This may or may not actually halt the Iranian nuclear effort. A limited set of Israeli preventive strikes could either force the United States to follow up, or create a situation in which Iran rejects all arms control and UN inspection and carries out a massive new disperse nuclear program or a crash basis. It could also drive Iran to lash out into a new wave of confrontation with the United States and Iran’s neighbors. A U.S.-led set of preventive strikes would be more successful, but the United States could only be sure of suppressing a meaningful Iran nuclear effort if it quickly re-strikes any known target it fails to destroy the first time, carries out constant surveillance of Iran, and repeatedly and thoroughly strikes at the targets created by any new Iranian initiatives. The United States would need regional support to do this and probably prolonged regional agreement to U.S. basing. At a minimum, the result would be years more of a regional arms race, military tension, and Iranian efforts to find ways to attack or pressure the Arab states, Israel, and United States. As the current conflict in Syria makes all too clear, no one can predict how much support the United States will really get from any of its allies, its own U.S. Congress, and no one can predict the limits to Iran’s reactions, ability to use third parties, and willingness to confront the United States and the region with new nuclear, missile, and asymmetric threats. The United States would face an almost certain challenge in the UN from Russia and China, and there is no way any U.S. action against Iran could be separated from Iran’s efforts in Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon; Afghanistan, or any other issue where Iran could try to find some form of revenge. This is not an argument for not acting. The risk of a fully nuclear Iran is simply too great. It is a very strong argument for finding a good alternative if one can be negotiated on realistic terms. The Uncertain Outcome of Iran Nuclear Weapons and Containment: The Most Likely Outcome is a No Win Escalation Ladder Contest If there are no preventive strikes – or preventive strikes fail to halt Iran – what is now a largely quiet one-sided nuclear arms race would become far more threatening. At one level, this arms race would become one between Iran and any allies it could find and the United States and its Arab allies in or near the Gulf. A nuclear Iran could change the balance in terms of the credibility of U.S. and Arab willingness to engage against Iranian threats, intimidation, and use of its asymmetric forces. It would inevitably make Gulf petroleum exports the scene of an ongoing arms race and constant tension, and risk a clash that might escalate in untended ways. What is less apparent – and needs far more realistic attention in Iran and outside assessments of the Iranian nuclear threat – is the impact of Iran actually going nuclear. One or several crude nuclear devices do not create a nuclear force. Iran cannot produce enough capable nuclear forces for at least the next decade to pose more of an existential threat to Israel than Israel can pose to Iran. Israel would scarcely be passive, however, and Israel already has far more capable missiles than Iran. Israel also has thermonuclear weapons, rather than the early fission devices Iran will probably be limited to for at least the next half-decade. As a result Israel will pose more of an existentialist threat to an Iran as dependent on the survival of Tehran than Iran can pose to an Israel dependent on the survival of Tel Aviv. As the United States and former Soviet Union both learned during the Cold War, even Iranian parity or superiority would be meaningless. The problem with mutually assured destruction is that no state can ever win an existential strike contest. As for the rest of the Middle East, if Iran shows it is going nuclear to enhance its power and dominate the Gulf region – as may be Iran’s real motive – the resulting threat to world oil exports and the world economy is not likely to intimidate to any degree that will benefit Iran. It will push both the United States and Arab states into responding. The fact Iran succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons might increase the level of deterrence of a direct invasion, but would not lead the United States, or surrounding Arab states to passively accept the result. The United States already is transferring more than ten times the value of Iran’s total arms imports to its Gulf allies. Its ties to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman already give the United States and its Gulf allies the ability to devastatingly defeat Iran in any direct military confrontation. Iran can only vastly increase the scale of the resulting destruction that the United States and its allies inflict if Iran ever actually escalates to the use of nuclear weapons. But the United States, the Arab allies, Israel, and other regional states will suffer as well – along with the global economy – if the end result is a major interruption in the flow of Gulf petroleum exports.

#### Middle east war goes global and nuclear

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The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

## 1NC – INSECURITY

#### Orthodox atomistic approaches to global problems makes extinction inevitable – we control causality of conflict

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Orthodox IR approaches: occluding systems, securitising crises, reifying violence 2.1 Disciplinary fragmentation Unfortunately, orthodox IR approaches are ill-equipped to understand the complexity of these interconnected global crises and their interdependent impacts on the international system. Generally, IR scholars have examined global crises as discrete phenomena. Economic and financial crises are studied within the discipline of International Political Economy, particularly with a view to understanding their structural causes and trajectories, sometimes including their impact on development, inequality and poverty. Energy depletion as a global systemic problem is rarely acknowledged in the IR literature, but when (rarely) acknowledged, it is largely viewed through the lens of energy policy as an arm of ‘national security’. Similarly, climate change is examined in the context of its strategic implications in exacerbating vulner- ability to violent conflict or scrutinised in the context of the scope for inter-state negotiations and global governance.54 For the most part, IR as a discipline has not fully acknowledged the real-world scale of these crises as inherently interdependent phenomena requiring an integrated and holistic theoretical appraisal. Many traditional neorealist scholars, of course, view environmental factors as of either minimal or negligible significance in identifying future security threats and explaining past, present or potential inter-state conflicts.55 Yet as evidence of climate change has become more disturbing, such perspectives have been increasingly contested. While some scholars tend to focus on the role of natural resource shortages or abundance in engendering conditions of anarchy and violence, others investigate the capacity or inability of states to negotiate viable cooperative international regulatory frameworks to prevent or respond to crises. As such, most theorists draw either implicitly or explicitly on neorealist or neoliberal assumptions about state behaviour in the international system, debilitating their ability to understand these crises precisely in their global systemic context. 2.2 Neorealism: tragedy as self-fulfilling prophecy In one salient example, O’Keefe draws extensively on both offensive and defensive variants of neorealist theory, including the work of Jack Snyder, Robert Jervis and Kenneth Waltz, to argue for realism’s continuing relevance in understanding how the ‘biophysical environment plays a significant role in triggering and prolonging the structural conditions that result in con- flict’. She notes that standard realist concepts such as ‘anarchy, security dilemmas, and the prison- er’s dilemma’ can be used to explain the emergence of environmental or resource-based violent conflicts largely within, and occasionally between, the weaker states of the South. ‘Environmental anarchy’ occurs in weak states which lack ‘active government regulation’ of the internal distri- bution of natural resources, leading to a ‘tragedy of the commons’. This generates resource scar- cities which lead to ‘security dilemmas’ over ownership of resources, often settled by resort to violence, perpetuated by ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’.56 Ultimately, this theoretical hypothesis on the causes of environmental or resource-related con- flict is incapable of engaging with the deeper intersecting global structural conditions generating resource scarcities, independently of insufficient government management of the internal distri- bution of resources in weak states. It simplistically applies the Hobbesian assumption that without a centralised ‘Leviathan’ state structure, the persistence of anarchy in itself generates con- flict over resources. Under the guise of restoring the significance of the biophysical environment to orthodox IR, this approach in effect actually occludes the environment as a meaningful causal factor, reducing it to a mere epiphenomenon of the dynamics of anarchy in the context of state failure. As a consequence, this approach is theoretically impotent in grasping the systemic accel- eration of global ecological, energy and economic crises as a direct consequence of the way in which the inter-state system itself exploits the biophysical environment. The same criticism in fact applies to opposing theories that resource abundance is a major cause of violent conflict. Bannon and Collier, for instance, argue that resource abundance and greed, rather than resource scarcity and political grievances, generated intra-state conflicts financed by the export of commodities in regions like Angola and Sierra Leone (diamonds) or West Africa (tropical timber). In other regions, abundance rather than shortages of oil, drugs and gold fuelled and financed violent secessionist movements in the context of widespread cor- ruption and poor governance.57 Ultimately, this departs little from the theoretical assumptions above, with weak central state governance still blamed for generating anarchic conditions conducive to conflict over abundant resources. Furthermore, as Kaldor shows, this simplistic per- spective overlooks the wider context of the global political economy – the evolution of regional ‘war economies’ was often enabled precisely by the devastating impact of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes, which eroded state structures and generated social crises that radicalised identity politics.58 Under traditional neorealist logic, a strategic response to global environmental crises must involve the expansion of state-military capabilities in order to strengthen the centralised govern- ance structures whose task is to regulate the international distribution of natural resources, as well as to ensure that a particular state’s own resource requirements are protected. Neorealism under- stands inter-state competition, rivalry and warfare as inevitable functions of states’ uncertainty about their own survival, arising from the anarchic structure of the international system. Gains for one state are losses for another, and each state’s attempt to maximise its power relative to all other states is simply a reflection of its rational pursuit of its own security. The upshot is the normalisation of political violence in the international system, including practices such as over-exploitation of energy and the environment, as a ‘rational’ strategy – even though this ulti- mately amplifies global systemic insecurity. Inability to cooperate internationally and for mutual benefit is viewed as an inevitable outcome of the simple, axiomatic existence of multiple states. The problem is that neorealism cannot explain in the first place the complex interdependence and escalation of global crises. Unable to situate these crises in the context of an international system that is not simply a set of states, but a transnational global structure based on a specific exploita- tive relationship with the biophysical environment, neorealism can only theorise global crises as ‘new issue areas’ appended to already existing security agendas.59 Yet by the very act of projecting global crises as security threats, neorealism renders itself powerless to prevent or mitigate them by theorising their root structural causes. In effect, despite its emphasis on the reasons why states seek security, neorealism’s approach to issues like climate change actually guarantees greater insecurity by promoting policies which frame these ‘non-traditional’ issues purely as amplifiers of quite traditional threats. As Susanne Peters argues, the neorealist approach renders the militarisation of foreign and domestic policy a pragmatic and necessary response to issues such as resource scarcities – yet, in doing so, it entails the inevitable escalation of ‘resource wars’ in the name of energy security. Practically, this serves not to increase security for competing state and non-state actors, but to debilitate inter- national security through the proliferation of violent conflict to access and control diminishing resources in the context of unpredictable complex emergencies.60 Neorealism thus negates its own theoretical utility and normative value. For if ‘security’ is the fundamental driver of state foreign policies, then why are states chronically incapable of effectively ameliorating the global systemic amplifiers of ‘insecurity’, despite the obvious rationale to do so in the name of warding off collective destruction, if not planetary annihilation?61 2.3 Neoliberalism: mutual over-exploitation as normative On the other hand, we have strategies of international cooperation to establish new global govern- ance regimes by which states can develop treaties and agreements to encourage mitigating action. It is now clear that the massive proliferation of international legal treaties designed to regulate activities impacting detrimentally on the environment and thus limit environmental degradation simply cannot be explained under the realist theoretical framework. While this seemingly vindi- cates neoliberal theoretical approaches which underscore the scope for rational state strategies of mutual cooperation,62 the latter are still at a loss to explain the extent to which ethical norms and values, national cultures and environmental and scientific advocacy underpin wide-ranging environmental regimes which cannot be reduced purely to state interests.63 Much of the liberal literature also explores the regressive dynamic of the energy industry and its international dimensions, though failing to escape realist assumptions about anarchy. Kaldor and her co-authors, for instance, note that conflicts can erupt in regions containing abundant resources when neopatrimonial states collapse due to competition between different ethnic and tribal factions motivated by the desire to control revenues.64 Similarly, Collier argues that the most impoverished populations inhabit the most resource-wealthy countries which, however, lack robust governance, encouraging rampant internal resource predation and therefore civil wars.65 Lack of robust governance thus facilitates not only internal anarchy over resource control, but also the illicit and corrupt activities of foreign companies, particularly in the energy sector, in exploiting these countries.66 This sort of analysis then leads to a staple set of normative prescriptions concerned largely with ways of inculcating ‘good governance’, such as transparency measures to avoid excessive secrecy under which oil companies indulge in corrup- tion; more robust international regulation; corporate social responsibility; and cosmopolitan prin- ciples such as democratisation, political equality and freedom of civil society.67 Yet such well-meaning recommendations often do not lead to sufficiently strong policy action by governments to rein in energy sector corruption.68 Furthermore, it is painfully clear from the examples of Kyoto, Copenhagen and Cancun that international cooperative state strategies con- tinue to be ineffective, with states unable to agree on the scale of the crises concerned, let alone on the policies required to address them. Indeed, while some modest successes were apparent in the Cancun Accord, its proposed voluntary emissions regime would still likely guarantee – according to even mid-range climate models – a global average temperature rise of 4°C or more, which would in turn culminate in many of the IPCC’s more catastrophic scenarios.69 This calls into question the efficacy of longstanding recommendations – such as Klare’s – that the international community develop unprecedented international mechanisms to coordinate the peaceful distribution of natural resources in the era of scarcity and environmental degradation.70 While at face value such regulatory governance mechanisms would appear essential to avoid violent conflict over depleting resources, they are posited in a socio-political and theoretical vacuum. Why is it that such potentially effective international mechanisms continue to be ignored? What are the socio-political obstacles to their implementation? Ultimately, the problem is that they overlook the structural and systemic causes of resource depletion and environmental degradation. Although neoliberalism shares neorealism’s assumptions about the centrality of the state as a unitary rational actor in the international system, it differs fundamentally in the notion that gains for one state do not automatically imply losses for another; therefore states are able to form coop- erative, interdependent relationships conducive to mutual power gains, which do not necessarily generate tensions or conflict.71 While neoliberalism therefore encourages international nego- tiations and global governance mechanisms for the resolution of global crises, it implicitly accepts the contemporary social, political and economic organisation of the international system as an unquestionable ‘given’, itself not subject to debate or reform.72 The focus is on developing the most optimal ways of maximising exploitation of the biophysi- cal environment. The role of global political economic structures (such as centralised private resource-ownership and deregulated markets) in both generating global systemic crises and inhi- biting effective means for their amelioration is neglected. As such, neoliberalism is axiomatically unable to view the biophysical environment in anything other than a rationalist, instrumentalist fashion, legitimising the over-exploitation of natural resources without limits, and inadvertently subordinating the ‘global commons’ to the competitive pressures of private sector profit-maximi- sation and market-driven solutions, rather than institutional reform.73 Mutual maximisation of power gains translates into the legitimisation of the unlimited exploitation of the biophysical environment without recognition of the human costs of doing so, which are technocratically projected merely as fixable aberrations from an optimal system of cooperative progress.74 Consequently, neoliberalism is powerless to interrogate how global political economic structures consistently undermine the establishment of effective environmental regimes. 2.4 The socio-historical evacuation of the political ecology of power Global ecological, economic and energy crises thus expose a core contradiction at the heart of modernity – that the material progress delivered by scientific reason in the service of unlimited economic growth is destroying the very social and environmental conditions of modernity’s very existence. This stark contradiction between official government recognition of the poten- tially devastating security implications of resource scarcity and the continued abject failure of government action to mitigate these security implications represents a fundamental lacuna that has been largely overlooked in IR theory and policy analysis. It reveals an analytical framework that has focused almost exclusively on potential symptoms of scarcity. But a truly complete picture of the international relations of resource scarcity would include not only a map of pro- jected impacts, but would also seek to grasp their causes by confronting how the present structure of the international system itself has contributed to the acceleration of scarcity, while inhibiting effective national and international responses. It could be suggested that the present risk-oriented preoccupation with symptoms is itself symptomatic of IR’s insufficient self-reflection on its own role in this problem. Despite the nor- mative emphasis on ensuring national and international security, the literature’s overwhelming preoccupation with gauging the multiplicity of ways in which ecological, energy and economic crises might challenge security in coming decades provides very little opening in either theory or policy to develop more effective strategies to mitigate or prevent these heightened security challenges. On the contrary, for the most part, these approaches tend to highlight the necessity to maximise national political–military and international regimes’ powers so that states might be able to respond more robustly in the event that new threats like resource wars and state failure do emerge. But the futility of this trajectory is obvious – a preoccupation with ‘security’ ends up becoming an unwitting accomplice in the intensification of insecurity. The extent of orthodox IR theory’s complicity in this predicament is evident in its reduction of inter-state relations to balance-of-power dynamics, despite a lack of determinate bases by which to define and delineate the dynamics of material power. While orthodox realism focuses inordinately on a military–political conceptualisation of national power, conventional attempts to extend this conceptualisation to include economic dimensions (including the role of transna- tional corporations) – as well as production, finance, ideas and institutions beyond the state – do not solve the problem.75 This Weberian proliferation of categorisations of the multiple dimen- sions of power, while useful, lacks a unifying explanatory order of determination capable of ren- dering their interconnections intelligible. As Rosenberg shows in his analysis of the dynamics of distinctive geopolitical orders from Rome to Spain – and Teschke in his exploration of the changing polities of continental Europe from the eighth to the eighteenth centuries – these orders have always been inseparably conjoined with their constitutive relations of production as structured in the context of prevailing social– property relations, illustrating the mutually-embedded nature of ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ power.76 In contrast, orthodox IR axiomatically fragments the ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ (and the latter further into ‘military’, ‘political’, ‘cultural’, etc.) into separate, autonomous spheres with no grasp of the scope of their interconnection.77 It also dislocates both the state, and human existence as such, from their fundamental material conditions of existence, in the form of their relationship to the biophysical environment, as mediated through relations of production, and the way these are governed and contested through social–property relations.78 By externalising the biophysical environment – and thus human metabolism with nature – from state praxis, orthodox IR simply lacks the conceptual cat- egories necessary to recognise the extent to which socio-political organisational forms are mutually constituted by human embeddedness in the natural world.79 While further fragmenting the international into a multiplicity of disconnected state units whose behaviour can only be ana- lysed through the limited lenses of anarchy or hierarchy, orthodox IR is incapable of situating these units in the holistic context of the global political economy, the role of transnational capi- talist classes, and the structural pressures thereby exerted on human and state behaviour.80 Indeed, the mediating structure of the global political economy – along with the beliefs and behav- iour of agents within it (through which this structure is constructed) – play a critical role in the trans- formation of ecological or resource-related events into concrete politically-defined conditions of ‘scarcity’ that lead to crisis or conflict. A powerful example is provided by Davis in his study of the impact of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) – the vast oscillation in air mass and Pacific Ocean temperature. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, ENSO created large-scale droughts in many countries peripheral to the European empires, including those in Asia (India, China, Java, the Philippines and Korea), and in Brazil, southern Africa, Algeria and Morocco. Davis shows that British ‘free market’ imperial policy converted these droughts into foreseeable but preventable deadly famines, multiplying death tolls to gross proportions without any historical precedent.81 In 1874–76, northern harvests were more than sufficient to provide reserves for the 1878 autumn crops deficit. But most of the grain from north-western Indian subsistence farming was controlled by a captive export sector designed to stabilise British grain prices, which from 1876 to 1877 had increased due to poor harvests. This generated a British demand that absorbed almost the entirety of north-western India’s wheat surplus. Meanwhile, profits from these grain exports were monopolised by wealthy property holders, moneylenders and grain merchants, as opposed to poor Indian farmers. India’s newly-constructed modern railway system shipped grain from drought areas ‘to central depots for hoarding’, leading to exorbitant price hikes that were ‘co-ordinated in a thousand towns at once’. Food prices rocketed out of the reach of ‘out- caste labourers, displaced weavers, sharecroppers and poor peasants’. Consequently, ‘the poor began to starve to death even in well-watered districts “reputed to be immune to food shortages”’. Thus, between 1877 and 1878, grain merchants exported a record 6.4 million hundredweight of wheat to Europe while between 5.5 and 12 million Indians starved to death. This catastrophe occurred ‘not outside the modern world system, but in the very process of being forcibly incor- porated into its economic and political structures’.82 As Dalby thus argues, ‘humans live in a complex interaction with environments that adapt and change in much more complex ways than is facilitated by linear thinking within the territorial boxes of contemporary administrative arrangements’. This suggests ‘that “global” markets and economic connections are essential to understanding the complex politics of “local” environments and struggles over access to specific resources in particular places’ – because the ‘geography of the domination of nature’ is precisely the continuing ‘history of colonisation and imperialism’.83 Hence, environmental and energy crises are generated in the context of historically-specific socio- political systems – and whether or not they lead to conflict depends on existing relations of power at local, national and transnational scales, and on how those relations are configured by structures of resource ownership, mediated by ideas and values, and supported by military power. 3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 Complicity This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1AC – it adopts a critical approach to IR

Bilgin 5—Pinar Bilgin, Associate Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University (Turkey) [“Conclusion,” Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415325498, p. 205-207]

Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that the only way for intellectuals to make a change is to get directly involved in political action. They can also intervene by providing a critique of the existing situation, calling attention to what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in regional politics. Students of security could help create the political space for alternative agents of security to take action by presenting appropriate critiques. It should be emphasised however that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. The hope is that non-state actors (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents of security when presented with an alternative reading of their situation. Thinking about the future becomes even more crucial once theory is [end page 205] conceptualised as constitutive of the ‘reality’ it seeks to respond to. In other words, our ideas about the future—our conjectures and prognoses—have a self-constitutive potential. What the students of Cold War Security Studies consider as a more ‘realistic’ picture of the future becomes ‘real’ through practice, albeit under circumstances inherited from the past. Thinking about what a ‘desired’ future would look like is significant for the very same reason; that is, in order to be able to turn it into a ‘reality’ through adopting emancipatory practices. For, having a vision of a ‘desired’ future empowers people(s) in the present. Presenting pictures of what a ‘desired’ future might look like, and pointing to the security community approach as the start of a path that could take us from an insecure past to a more secure future is not to suggest that the creation of a security community is the most likely outcome. On the contrary, the dynamics pointed to throughout the book indicate that there exists a potential for descent into chaos if no action is taken to prevent militarisation and fragmentation of societies, and the marginalisation of peoples as well as economies in an increasingly globalising world. However, these dynamics exist as ‘threats to the future’ to use Beck’s terminology; and only by thinking and writing about them that can one mobilise preventive action to be taken in the present. Viewed as such, critical approaches present not an ‘optimistic’, but a more ‘realistic’ picture of the future. Considering how the ‘realism’ of Cold War Security Studies failed not only when judged by its own standards, by failing to provide an adequate explanation of the world ‘out there’, but also when judged by the standards of critical approaches, as it was argued, it could be concluded that there is a need for more ‘realistic’ approaches to regional security in theory and practice. The foregoing suggests three broad conclusions. First, Cold War Security Studies did not present the ‘realistic’ picture it purported to provide. On the contrary, the pro-status quo leanings of the Cold War security discourse failed to allow for (let alone foresee) changes such as the end of the Cold War, dissolution of some states and integration of some others. Second, notwithstanding the important inroads critical approaches to security made in the post-Cold War era, much traditionalist thinking remains and maintains its grip over the security practices of many actors. Third, critical approaches offer a fuller or more adequate picture of security in different parts of the world (including the Middle East). Cold War Security Studies is limited not only because of its narrow (military-focused), pro-status quo and state-centric (if not statist) approach to security in theory and practice, but also because of its objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship that obscured the mutually constitutive relationship between them. Students of critical approaches have sought to challenge Cold War Security Studies, its claim to knowledge and its hold over security practices by pointing to the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice and revealing [end page 206] how the Cold War security discourse has been complicit in constituting (in)security in different parts of the world. The ways in which the Cold War security discourse helped constitute the ‘Middle East’ by way of representing it as a region, and contributed to regional insecurity in the Middle East by shaping security practices, is exemplary of the argument that ‘theories do not leave the world untouched’. The implication of these conclusions for practice is that becoming aware of the ‘politics behind the geographical specification of politics’ and exploring the relationship between (inventing) regions and (conceptions and practices of) security helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. An alternative approach to security, that of critical approaches to security, could inform alternative (emancipatory) practices thereby helping constitute a new region in the form of a security community. It should be noted, however, that to argue that ‘everything is socially constructed’ or that ‘all approaches have normative concerns embedded in them’ is a significant first step that does not by itself help one adopt emancipatory practices. As long as people rely on traditional practices shaped by the Cold War security discourse - which remains prevalent in the post-Cold War era - they help constitute a ‘reality’ in line with the tenets of ‘realist’ Cold War Security Studies. This is why seeking to address evolving crises through traditional practices whilst leaving a critical security perspective to be adopted for the long-term will not work. For, traditionalist thinking and practices, by helping shape the ‘reality’ ‘out there’, foreclose the political space necessary for emancipatory practices to be adopted by multiple actors at numerous levels. Hence the need for the adoption of a critical perspective that emphasises the roles human agency has played in the past and could play in the future in shaping what human beings choose to call ‘reality’. Generating such an awareness of the potentialities of human agency could enable one to begin thinking differently about regional security in different parts of the world whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors’ multiple and contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent(s) and how they think security should be sought in different parts of the world. After decades of statist, military-focused and zero-sum thinking and practices that privileged the security of some whilst marginalising the security of others, the time has come for all those interested in security in the Middle East to decide whether they want to be agents of a world view that produces more of the same, thereby contributing towards a ‘threat to the future’, or of alternative futures that try to address the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity. The choice is not one between presenting a more ‘optimistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ vision of the future, but between stumbling into the future expecting more of the same, or stepping into a future equipped with a perspective that not only has a conception of a ‘desired’ future but is also cognisant of ‘threats to the future’.

## 1NC – DA (1)

#### Lifting the embargo signals US weakness and strengthens the regime

Brookes 9 (Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs, “Keep the Embargo, O” April 16, 2009, The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o>)

Sure, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years -- even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit America. And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty -- even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there. In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not. And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift. Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies. So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us. Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang. Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course. Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left. Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad. The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already. The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association. Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in. We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.) With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere. The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers. The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet? Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### Strong strategies are key to maintain international credible image of the US

Enold 09 (Scott A. Enold, Colonel, United States Air Force, “ROGUE STATES AND DETERRENCE STRATEGY” 02-04-2009, Strategy research project)

To effectively engage rogue states who have proliferated nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction or are attempting to proliferate them, the United States must develop and implement an effective policy designed to persuade, pursue and punish those governments and regimes. The United States government must possess extreme tactics and measures. Preemptive targeting must be available if rogue states or actors utilize nuclear terror tactics as they seek political gains or to be recognized as a key participant in the world balance of power. It is imperative that rogue states or actors cannot employ nuclear weapons. As rogue states acquire nuclear technology, the United States must develop a range of policies to apply constant pressure on these states. The United States must be prepared to demonstrate resiliency to attacks should they occur. The United States government must prepare its citizens to accept the fact terrorist acts will occur on the continent. The citizens must understand that every effort is made to protect the population. Actors exist who seek to harm citizens or provide evidence of weak resolve or weak policies inside the United States. In doing so, rouge states or actors seek to secure a foothold for a continued exploitation of the United States. Presently, the United States National Security Strategy does not lay out a direct policy demonstrating a complete and unconditional strategy to stop rogue state or actor nuclear weapon employment. There must be actionable and if necessary violent steps available to take against rogue states and actors. They must to be aware of and understand the harsh retaliation should they chose to utilize a nuclear option.

#### That avoids US-Sino conflict – tons of flashpoints

Dobbins 12 (James Dobbins, American diplomat who served as United States Ambassador to the European Union and as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Member of the American Academy of Diplomacy “War with China” August 1 2012) CA

While the risk of conflict with China cannot be ignored, neither should it be exaggerated. Any number of other conflicts are more likely, some in places we cannot even vaguely foresee at present. These more likely conflicts will be with opponents quite different from China and will call for capabilities quite dissimilar from those required to deal with a real peer competitor. Individually, these contingencies will be less consequential than a conflict with China, but collectively they will shape the international environment in which both countries interact, and will fundamentally influence Chinese perceptions of American power and determination. Coping successfully with these smaller challenges may be one of the best ways to ensure that the United States and China never have to fight the larger conflict.

#### Any conflict goes nuclear

McDaniel 7 (Aby McDaniel, “United States vs China - Consequences of a Nuclear War” The Internationalist http://www.abytheliberal.com/world-politics/united-states-vs-china-consequences-of-a-nuclear-war) CA

A nuclear war between China and United States will likely be a US first strike on China. Due to its smaller arsenal and limited number of ICBMs, China would not risk a first strike on the US mainland. Hence, we will assume a US first strike and what follows. In the advent of a US first strike on China, the targets are more likely to be Chinese ICBM silos, as the US would first attempt to eliminate chances of retaliation as much as possible. A US attack on China’s ICBM silos would kill at least 1.5 million to 20 million civilians depending on the type and the number of warheads used. Assuming that most of its land based silos have been destroyed, China’s choice of retaliatory strike would be its submarine based SLBMs. Assuming that 12 JL-2 SLBMs with MIRV warheads are launched from two Jin class submarines, at least 20 of the largest American cities could be targeted. This would result in extermination of 25 million to 100 million civilians, which would be more devastating on the US than the first strike would be on China.

If we take more realistic standards, a nuclear war between China and USA would result in much higher casualties for both sides, due to real world lack of considerations. One would most likely obliterate the other or worse, both countries would be destroyed before a truce or victory call could be reached. It is more likely that Americans would suffer the most because of their lower population and lack of creature comforts (that they are habituated to). The Chinese on the other hand, would have more suvivours because of their much larger population, which is also much more adapted to adversity and wars than the American people.

## 1NC – CP

#### Using its licensing authority and enforcement discretion, the United States Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control should exempt transactions involving oil from enforcement under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

#### The counterplan solves via specific exemptions — OFAC has broad discretion over sanctions enforcement.

Golumbic and Ruff 13 — Court E. Golumbic, Managing Director and Global Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Bribery and Government Sanctions Compliance Officer at Goldman Sachs & Co., Lecturer-in-Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, former Assistant United States Attorney with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and Robert S. Ruff III, Associate in the Securities Litigation practice group at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 2013 (“Leveraging the Three Core Competencies: How OFAC Licensing Optimizes Holistic Sanctions,” *North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation* (38 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 729), Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

2. Ability to Mitigate Collateral Damage

Because OFAC prefers to formulate its sanctions program broadly, its economic sanctions can affect the lives of unintended targets, such as ordinary citizens of foreign countries that have no influence in their sanctioned government. n347 The broad reach of U.S. sanctions can also unnecessarily put U.S. citizens and companies at a competitive disadvantage, undermine international support for the sanctions programs, and even undermine the policy objectives of the programs. n348 One way in which OFAC mitigates [\*792] the collateral damage of its holistic sanctions is by issuing licenses that permit U.S. citizens to export food and medical supplies n349 and provide humanitarian aid n350 to people in sanctioned countries. In an effort to avoid placing private enterprises at an unnecessary competitive disadvantage, which can damage U.S. influence internationally and U.S. interests as a whole, OFAC may also allow certain activities from an otherwise sanctioned country. n351 Additionally, OFAC issues licenses to avoid interfering with the legitimate activities of international and charitable organizations and to permit U.S. persons to participate in such organizations. n352 By licensing these types of activities and transactions, OFAC focuses its sanctions and the punitive consequences thereof, to the extent possible, on those in a position to produce the desired change, rather than on innocent civilians and businesses. n353

## 1NC – DA (2)

#### Russian Economy will not collapse – stable now

Adomanis 8/27 – (2013, Mark Contributor for Forbes Magazine, http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/08/27/do-you-think-russias-economy-is-doomed-the-bond-market-doesnt-agree/) rss

Earlier this year I wrote [several articles](http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/01/07/why-russias-economy-isnt-going-to-collapse/) pushing back against some [particularly alarmist](http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/12/30/the-end-of-putinomics.html) interpretations of Russia’s economy. After predicting Russia’s imminent implosion no less than 6 or 7 different times over the past decade I’m genuinely amazed that Owen Matthews wasn’t a little more gunshy in saying that 2013 was definitely the year in which everything would come crashing down around the Kremlin’s ears, but you really do not need to search very long or hard to find people who are [extremely disdainful](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-20/is-russia-already-in-recession-.html) of Russia’s economic performance and of the “obliviousness” and general stupidity of its policy makers.¶ It’s true that Russia’s economy is [slowing down](http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/08/19/russias-economy-really-is-slowing-down-unemployment-ticked-up-in-q2-2013/) and its also true that the authorities [don’t have any easy choices](http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/us-russia-gdp-forecast-idUSBRE97P0C620130826): monetary easing will likely spark inflation, and the state’s ability to engage in fiscal pump-priming is highly constrained. Growth over the next few years will be decidedly sub-par when compared to the 2000 boom years and even to the modest 2010-12 bounce back from the Great Recession.¶ However, if Russia really was rapidly approaching an economic dead-end, if there was increasingly recognition that its model was not going to survive, you would expect to see the Russian government’s borrowing costs go up. Yes Russia’s stock of government debt is not particularly large (at only around 10% of GDP) but if the market came to an understanding that the economic situation was going to get a lot worse in the not too distant future then investors would demand higher returns. Demand for Russian debt would go down, and the interest rates on that debt would go up. Economics 101.¶ And that’s exactly what happened during the worst days of the 2008-09 crisis: Russia’s borrowing costs skyrocketed from around 7% to almost 11% because there were serious, and perfectly understandable, doubts about Russia’s ability to weather the economic storm.¶ Since the crisis ended, however, the interest rates on long-term Russian government securities haven’t done much – they’ve bounced around within a relatively narrow range and are at about the same level now that they were back in 2006. This would seem, to me at least, to reflect market expectations of business as usual: not overly-rapid economic growth, but certainly not some sort of spectacular collapse.¶ Is it possible that the bond market is wrong? Sure. It’s possible that the market is wrong just as it is possible that Putin will be overthrown before the end of the year or that I will win the lottery. Almost anything is possible. But it certainly does not seem likely that the bond market would be so studiously immune to a mounting economic catastrophe. What that chart says to me is that things will continue in pretty much same vein, and that there aren’t going to be any big changes one way or another.¶ Russia’s economy might not be performing particularly well at the moment, but there’s very little evidence that it’s going to come screeching to a halt. So if like many Westerners you’re eagerly waiting for Putin to be ousted by a crippling economic crisis, you’re going to be waiting for a long time.

#### Lifting the embargo decreases oil prices

**Cala, 13 –** (Andres Cala, author on energy security. July 7, 2011. “Drill, Cuba, Drill.” http://www.energytribune.com/8204/drill-cuba-drill#sthash.4mplZhlX.dpbs)//SDL

The US should be cheering, not just because any significant oil find will contribute directly and immediately to American energy security. Assuming lifting the embargo is still too politically risky (and it shouldn’t be), Congress should seize the imminent arrival of the rig, the Norwegian designed Scarabeo 9, to relax the embargo on the communist island to allow US energy companies to partake in Cuban exploration and production.¶ Forget the fact that being communist or anti-democratic is no deterrent to American energy industry elsewhere. The US already imports almost 10 percent of its oil from Cuba’s closest ally Venezuela. Should the US now also penalize all companies investing there, including American ones?¶ It makes no sense to thwart Cuban efforts to increase oil output perhaps in as little as three years, especially considering oil prices that will remain stubbornly high because demand growth is rising faster than supply growth.

#### Oil prices key to Russia’s economy – over half of government revenue

**Schuman, 12 –** (Michael Schuman, Associated Press Staff Writer for Times. July 5, 2012. “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices,” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/)//SDL

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself.¶ Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues.¶ What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago.¶ Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity.

**Russian economic decline causes nuclear war**

**Filger 9** (Sheldon, Author – Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction”, <http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356>)

**In Russia**, historically, **economic** health **and** political **stability are intertwined** to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that **desperate personnel would** illicitly **sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations**. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

## 1NC – Spills

#### No extinction

Sagoff 97  Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law Symposium Defining Takings: Private Property And The Future Of Government Regulation: Muddle Or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets The Endangered Species Act”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on the brink of an episode of massive extinction, it may not follow from this grim fact that human beings will suffer as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans one iota." n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "The human species could survive just as well if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346   [\*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349  Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain even if every threatened organism becomes extinct. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352   [\*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they?  Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.  One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, biodiversity matters only up to a point; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make little difference." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for   [\*912]  the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless.

#### All companies have experience with spills – solves

Nerurkar and Sullivan ‘11

Neelesh Nerurkar, Specialist in Energy Policy, and Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service, 2011, “Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development: Background and U.S. Policy Considerations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41522.pdf

It is difficult to assess the likelihood of a spill. According to Saipem, Scarabeo-9 is built to Norwegian standards, including extra equipment to shut off blown-out wells beyond what is required in the United States.30 Repsol has significant offshore experience, including projects in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. It has had issues with oil spills, which is not abnormal for an oil company.31 Among other Cuban lease holders, Petrobras and Statoil have extensive offshore experience, including projects in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, and are generally seen as accomplished offshore operators. Petronas, ONGC, and PetroVietnam also have offshore experience. PdVSA does not, but its offshore project appears the furthest from seeing drilling activity among existing licenses.

#### Coast guard solves the impact

McClatchy ‘11

McClatchy Newspapers, 2-4-2011, “Coast Guard preparing for Cuba oil spills,” http://www.theolympian.com/2010/09/30/1531424/coast-guard-preparing-for-cuba.html

The new U.S. Coast Guard commander for the southeastern United States said Thursday that his agency is looking "very seriously'' at Cuba's plans to drill for oil and reviewing contingency plans in the event of a spill that could reach the Florida coast. "We are actively looking at all the different implications and scenarios to make sure our plans are revised and up to date,'' Rear Adm. William D. Baumgartner told editors at the Miami Herald. He said other agencies also are reviewing their plans. The Spanish oil giant Repsol has leased several undersea blocks from the Cuban government and is expected to begin drilling next year with a rig, the Scarabeo 9, that is being built in China in part to avoid conflicts with the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. The first block Repsol is expected to explore lies under 5,600 feet of water — 600 feet deeper than the water where BP's Deepwater Horizon well exploded in April — and about 55 miles south of Florida's Marquesas Key. Baumgartner acknowledged that the United States has no emergency response agreement with Cuba for oil spills. The U.S. signed such an agreement with Mexico in 1980. "We have longstanding agreements with Mexico about how we would manage incidents and the . . . plan is routinely monitored,'' Baumgartner said. "There is not a bilateral U.S.-Cuba agreement on oil spills right now.'' While some oil industry analysts worry that Cuba would be ill prepared for an oil spill, Baumgartner noted that Repsol would be responsible for cleaning up any spill that entered U.S. waters and that the Coast Guard would manage any cleanup in U.S. waters. "There are international agreements that discuss the notification and information sharing that has to happen between countries,'' he said.

#### Spills stay contained

Whittle ‘12

Daniel J. Whittle et al, Cuba Program Director for the Oceans Program, Environmental Defense Fund, 2012, “Bridging the Gulf: Finding Common Ground on Environmental and Safety Preparedness for Offshore Oil and Gas in Cuba,” http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Bridging\_the\_Gulf-2012.pdf

In preparation for Repsol’s exploration project in 2012, NOAA generated computer tracking models to assess the threat to U.S. coasts and shorelines from deepwater drilling off the coast of Cuba. NOAA selected 20 potential deepwater drilling sites from the western region of Cuba to the Bahamas. The model was run using 200 different spill scenarios based on a variety of ocean current and weather conditions. According to the agency’s first study of a hypothetical spill from a deepwater well site offshore of Cuba, the area at highest risk of shoreline impact could be the eastern shore of Florida.40 Areas as far north as Charleston, South Carolina could face potential shoreline risk, though the modeled scenario predicted a lower likelihood of oiling for shorelines north of the Florida border.

## 1NC – Economy

#### Zero risk of terrorism- their impact is alarmism

Mueller ’12 (John, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, The Terrorism Delusion, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 81–110, Summer 2012)

Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. In 2005 an FBI report found that, despite years of well-funded sleuthing, the Bureau had yet to uncover a single true al-Qaida sleeper cell in the United States. The report was secret but managed to be leaked. Brian Ross, “Secret FBI Report Questions Al Qaeda Capabilities: No ‘True’ Al Qaeda Sleeper Agents Have Been Found in U.S.,” ABC News, March 9, 2005. Fox News reported that the FBI, however, observed that “just because there’s no concrete evidence of sleeper cells now, doesn’t mean they don’t exist.” “FBI Can’t Find Sleeper Cells,” Fox News, March 10, 2005. Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002. 47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.” 48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000. 49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders. 50 If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs. Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin. There is delusion, as well, in the legal expansion of the concept of “weapons of mass destruction.” The concept had once been taken as a synonym for nuclear weapons or was meant to include nuclear weapons as well as weapons yet to be developed that might have similar destructive capacity. After the Cold War, it was expanded to embrace chemical, biological, and radiological weapons even though those weapons for the most part are incapable of committing destruction that could reasonably be considered “massive,” particularly in comparison with nuclear ones. 52

#### Bioweapons won’t spread or cause epidemics

Gregg Easterbrook, senior fellow at The New Republic, July 2003, Wired, “We’re All Gonna Die!” http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic\_set=

3. Germ warfare!Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn’t kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today’s Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.

#### Global democracy inevitable – also no impact

Tow 10—Director of the Future Planet Research Centre (David, Future Society- The Future of Democracy, 26 August 2010, http://www.australia.to/2010/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=4280:future-society-the-future-of-democracy&catid=76:david-tow&Itemid=230)

Democracy, as with all other processes engineered by human civilisation, is evolving at a rapid rate. A number of indicators are pointing to a major leap forward, encompassing a more public participatory form of democratic model and the harnessing of the expert intelligence of the Web. By the middle of the 21st century, such a global version of the democratic process will be largely in place. Democracy has a long evolutionary history. The concept of democracy - the notion that men and women have the right to govern themselves, was practised at around 2,500 BP in Athens. The Athenian polity or political body, granted all citizens the right to be heard and to participate in the major decisions affecting their rights and well-being. The City State demanded services and loyalty from the individual in return. There is evidence however that the role of popular assembly actually arose earlier in some Phoenician cities such as Sidon and Babylon in the ancient assemblies of Syria- Mesopotamia, as an organ of local government and justice. As demonstrated in these early periods, democracy, although imperfect, offered each individual a stake in the nation’s collective decision-making processes. It therefore provided a greater incentive for each individual to cooperate to increase group productivity. Through a more open decision process, improved innovation and consequently additional wealth was generated and distributed more equitably. An increase in overall economic wellbeing in turn generated more possibilities and potential to acquire knowledge, education and employment, coupled with greater individual choice and freedom. According to the Freedom House Report, an independent survey of political and civil liberties around the globe, the world has made great strides towards democracy in the 20th and 21st centuries. In 1900 there were 25 restricted democracies in existence covering an eighth of the world’s population, but none that could be judged as based on universal suffrage. The US and Britain denied voting rights to women and in the case of the US, also to African Americans. But at the end of the 20th century 119 of the world’s 192 nations were declared electoral democracies. In the current century, democracy continues to spread through Africa and Asia and significantly also the Middle East, with over 130 states in various stages of democratic evolution. Dictatorships or quasi democratic one party states still exist in Africa, Asia and the middle east with regimes such as China, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Burma, the Sudan, Belarus and Saudi Arabia, seeking to maintain total control over their populations. However two thirds of sub-Saharan countries have staged elections in the past ten years, with coups becoming less common and internal wars gradually waning. African nations are also starting to police human rights in their own region. African Union peacekeepers are now deployed in Darfur and are working with UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The evolution of democracy can also be seen in terms of improved human rights. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and several ensuing legal treaties, define political, cultural and economic rights as well as the rights of women, children, ethnic groups and religions. This declaration is intended to create a global safety net of rights applicable to all peoples everywhere, with no exceptions. It also recognises the principle of the subordination of national sovereignty to the universality of human rights; the dignity and worth of human life beyond the jurisdiction of any State. The global spread of democracy is now also irreversibly linked to the new cooperative globalisation model. The EU, despite its growing pains, provides a compelling template; complementing national decisions in the supra-national interest at the commercial, financial, legal, health and research sharing level. The global spread of new technology and knowledge also provides the opportunity for developing countries to gain a quantum leap in material wellbeing; an essential prerequisite for a stable democracy. The current cyber-based advances therefore presage a much more interactive public form of democracy and mark the next phase in its ongoing evolution. Web 2.0’s social networking, blogging, messaging and video services have already significantly changed the way people discuss political issues and exchange ideas beyond national boundaries. In addition a number of popular sites exist as forums to actively harness individual opinions and encourage debate about contentious topics, funnelling them to political processes. These are often coupled to online petitions, allowing the public to deliver requests to Government and receive a committed response. In addition there are a plethora of specialized smart search engines and analytical tools aimed at locating and interpreting information about divisive and complex topics such as global warming and medical stem cell advances. These are increasingly linked to Argumentation frameworks and Game theory, aimed at supporting the logical basis of arguments, negotiation and other structured forms of group decision-making. New logic and statistical tools can also provide inference and evaluation mechanisms to better assess the evidence for a particular hypothesis. By 2030 it is likely that such ‘intelligence-based’ algorithms will be capable of automating the analysis and advice provided to politicians, at a similar level of quality and expertise as that offered by the best human advisers. It might be argued that there is still a need for the role of politicians and leaders in assessing and prioritising such expert advice in the overriding national interest. But a moment’s reflection leads to the opposite conclusion. Politicians have party allegiances and internal obligations that can and do create serious conflicts of interest and skew the best advice. History is replete with such disastrous decisions based on false premises, driven by party political bias and populist fads predicated on flawed knowledge. One needs to look no further in recent times than the patently inadequate evidential basis for the US’s war in Iraq which has cost at least half a million civilian lives and is still unresolved. However there remains a disjunction between the developed west and those developing countries only now recovering from colonisation, the subsequent domination by dictators and fascist regimes and ongoing natural disasters. There is in fact a time gap of several hundred years between the democratic trajectory of the west and east, which these countries are endeavouring to bridge within a generation; often creating serious short-term challenges and cultural dislocations. A very powerful enabler for the spread of democracy as mentioned is the Internet/Web- today’s storehouse of the world’s information and expertise. By increasing the flow of essential intelligence it facilitates transparency, reduces corruption, empowers dissidents and ensures governments are more responsive to their citizen’s needs. Ii is already providing the infrastructure for the emergence of a more democratic society; empowering all people to have direct input into critical decision processes affecting their lives, without the distortion of political intermediaries. By 2040 more democratic outcomes for all populations on the planet will be the norm. Critical and urgent decisions relating to global warming, financial regulation, economic allocation of scarce resources such as food and water, humanitarian rights and refugee migration etc, will to be sifted through community knowledge, resulting in truly representative and equitable global governance. Implementation of the democratic process itself will continue to evolve with new forms of e-voting and governance supervision, which will include the active participation of advocacy groups supported by a consensus of expert knowledge via the Intelligent Web 4.0. Over time democracy as with all other social processes, will evolve to best suit the needs of its human environment. It will emerge as a networked model- a non-hierarchical, resilient protocol, responsive to rapid social change. Such distributed forms of government will involve local communities, operating with the best expert advice from the ground up; the opposite of political party self-interested power and superficial focus-group decision-making, as implemented by many current political systems. These are frequently unresponsive to legitimate minority group needs and can be easily corrupted by powerful lobby groups, such as those employed by the heavy carbon emitters in the global warming debate.

No explosions to LNG – plan has no internal link to explostions…. explain

HZB 6

Hazardous Cargo Bulletin, “Exploding the Myth”

http://etc.am.szczecin.pl/files/download/HCB%20Nov%2006.pdf

September 2004, Lord Levene, chairman of Lloyd’s, the specialist insurance market, stated that “specialists reckon that a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker would have the force of a small nuclear explosion”. This phrase has since been repeated endlessly in numerous debates around the world on LNG safety. In particular the website timrileylaw.com claims that “the cargo of a typical 125,000 m3 LNGC has the energy equivalent of seven tenths of a megaton of TNT or that of 55 Hiroshima bombs”. Although those familiar with LNG readily dismiss these comments as completely untrue, the general public is left unsure of what to believe. This article examines these claims and looks at the comparative outcome of a nuclear explosion and a large LNG fire and demonstrates that the power of a nuclear explosion is several million times that of an LNG fire. Although many people can associate an explosion with potential injury, in general the public is not overly familiar with what exactly an explosion is and how it may injure them. Perhaps the simplest description is that an explosion is a sudden and violent release of energy, with the level of violence dependent on the rate at which the energy is released. For example, the energy in an inflated balloon can be released suddenly when it bursts, or slowly when it is gradually deflated. Both events stem from the same potential energy but they have significantly different outcomes. There is a significant problem with the way that the properties of LNG are portrayed. In statements like that of Lord Levene, the properties of LNG are discussed in terms of the amount of energy that it contains. However, as we have seen in the example of the balloon, this parameter is not the one we should be considering when we think about how much harm an LNG spill could do to people and property, should there ever be an incident when LNG vapour is ignited. Instead, we should be considering the problem in terms of how this energy gets transferred from the LNG or nuclear bomb to the surrounding environment, and the resulting damage that this energy can do. As such, the first thing we need to do is compare the energy found in both events. Do the math As a base, the energy in a 20 kiloton nuclear bomb is roughly 80 tera joules (TJ). With the energy in 1 kg of LNG approximately 54 mega joules (MJ), and the density of LNG being ~450 kg/m3, the total energy in the cargo of a typical 135,000 m3 LNG carrier is 135,000 m3 x 450 x 54 = 3,280 TJ. There is no question that in terms of base energy this approximates to 40 times that of our representative nuclear bomb. Using the same calculation, however, the energy in the timber cargo of a typical handysize bulk carrier carrying 43,000 m3 of 700 kg/ m3 timber with an energy per kg of 16 MJ = 481 TJ, i.e. approximately six times that of our representative nuclear bomb. We do not appear to be worried that these bulk carriers are a significant threat to the public, nor do we worry about the forests that surround many of our homes suddenly exploding with the force of six nuclear bombs. The rate at which energy is transferred over a time interval is its power, and it is this which differentiates a nuclear bomb from ignited LNG vapours or wood. The average power is the work done divided by the time interval, giving us a unit of power of the joule per second – more commonly known as the watt. If we consider the power from a nuclear explosion releasing 80 TJ, then this energy will be released in less than a microsecond, resulting in the phenomenally high power of 8E13 mega watts (MW). In doing the same calculation for LNG it should be strongly emphasised that the perfect cloud described below is not what would happen in reality. In an actual event the release would take place over a period of time and form a dense gas cloud close to the water or ground level with the majority of the cloud lying outside of the 5 to 15 per cent flammable range for methane. In the case of a hypothetical ‘perfect’ methane cloud under ‘ideal’ conditions, the incident would involve the instantaneous release, vaporisation and stoichiometric mixture of the vapour in air (~9.5 per cent by volume for pure methane). This mixture would have the following characteristics for complete combustion CH4 + 2(O2 + 3.76N2) ➠CO2 + 2H2O + 2(3.76N2) The total stoichiometric volume of this gas/air gas tankers Exploding the myth ENERGY The anti-LNG lobby has compared LNG ships to nuclear bombs – is this simply emotional scaremongering or does the comparison have any basis in fact? Roger Roue of SIGTTO and Gordon Milne of Lloyd’s Register debunk the nuclear myth Natural gas burns well, which is why it is transported around the world, but LNG is no match for a nuclear bomb HAZARDOUS CARGO BULLETIN November 2006 gas tankers 42 mix would be approximately 8.5E8 m3. This would result in a sphere of 588 m radius. Assuming that it was ignited in the centre and the flame front advanced at 4 m/sec it would take 147 seconds to burn (even longer if the ignition location were elsewhere in the cloud). Therefore, the power released in the event of the entire cargo contents of an LNG carrier being ignited would be 3,280/147 = approximately 2.2E7 MW. Therefore whilst in terms of total energy, LNG has significantly more than a nuclear bomb, if we consider the rate of energy release during an incident, the nuclear device will have almost 4 million times that of the LNG cargo. It is this ratio that truly describes the relative severity of each event. This analysis can be taken further. As previously indicated, we are concerned about how the energy is transferred from the original material to people and property nearby. The energy from a nuclear incident is released in a multitude of forms such as sound, heat and pressure. If we consider a nuclear explosion, the actual yield is split up into the following approximate percentages: Σ blast — 40 to 60 per cent of total energy Σ thermal radiation — 30 to 50 per cent of total energy Σ ionizing radiation — 5 per cent of total energy Σ residual radiation (fallout) — 5 to 10 per cent of total energy. Unconfined blast The first item, blast, involves a rapidly moving high pressure wave emanating from the location of the ignition. This wave can cause damage in two ways: firstly, through excess differential pressure such as on the back and front of a structure and, secondly, via drag loading from the extremely strong blast winds formed by the blast wave. Structures fail due to excessive loads, and injury occurs directly to people due to the overpressure damaging vital organs such as the lungs and indirectly via physically throwing the person against a solid object. For a nuclear incident these two forms of damage are extremely pronounced. The pressure wave associated with a nuclear device is optimised for a particular range – with an 85 kPa event being a reasonable middle-of-the-range figure. At such an overpressure we would see some people killed by lung damage and 80 per cent suffering eardrum injuries. The indirect winds would be expected to reach several hundred km/hr and it is this that would cause the most injuries, with a 100 per cent casualty rate for those caught in the main area of blast. For a 20 kt nuclear bomb these effects could be seen up to around 2 km from the incident. In comparison, there have been a number of experiments examining the consequences of an LNG vapour cloud being ignited. It is a commonly held perception outside of the LNG industry that when methane is ignited it detonates violently. This is easy to understand as most people are not experts in fire engineering. However, numerous historical experiments have all shown that methane vapour will not detonate in an unconfined/unenclosed area, such as the open air surrounding an LNG tanker. Instead there will be a slow moving flame front and this is one of the major factors that would prevent a pressure wave from being created. As a result, rather than an explosion with associated overpressure and blast waves, we would instead expect to see a relatively slow-burning vapour cloud fire. This was demonstrated during a series of experiments at Maplin Sands in 1980. These showed that ignition of LNG vapour clouds did not produce any significant overpressures, with the peak variation actually a localised under pressure of 0.08 kPa and average flame speeds of 4 m/s. Hence, there would be no injury to people and no destruction of buildings. It is straightforward to say that there are no grounds for comparison between the blast effects of a nuclear bomb and ignition of LNG vapours from a damaged ship.

## 1NC – Relations

#### Stability is the key motivating factor for China in Taiwan – only the plan changes that

AP, 3/9/’11

(“China challenges U.S. edge in Asia-Pacific”)

If U.S. military planners are worried about that possibility, they are not showing it. They say plans to cap defense spending within five years will not derail modernization plans. Pacific Command chief Adm. Robert Willard said last month that, while the United States carefully watches China’s growing military capabilities - and urges greater openness from China about them - the United States does not need to change its strategy.

China maintains it does not have offensive intentions, and analysts say that military action in the region would hurt its export-driven economy, which could threaten what its government prizes above all else - domestic stability. The U.S. military presence also may benefit China as it restrains neighbors like South Korea and Japan from seeking nuclear weapons.

As U.S. and Chinese forces increasingly rub up against each other in the western Pacific, the United States says it wants to promote military ties with China to prevent a chance skirmish and for China to develop as a “responsible major power.” To date, China has been reluctant to engage meaningfully after the recent restoration of military ties that were cut over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

“This is not the Cold War with two rival camps facing each other,” said Michael Schiffer, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia. “We are seeking a military-to-military relationship that is broad and deep enough to manage our differences while expanding on areas of common interest.”

#### The plan alone is our link and impact – US competition over oil in Latin America is the most probable scenario for nuclear conflict – China is all in on resources – the impact is Chinese lashout

Leverett 2005 (Flynt, senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute. The Washington Quarterly 29.1 (2005) 187-201. <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v029/29.1leverett.html>.)

The bid by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to acquire Unocal earlier this year triggered not only a hostile reaction in the U.S. Congress but also growing interest and debate within the foreign policy community about the rapid growth in China's energy demand and the prospect for competition between the United States and China for access to global oil and gas resources.1 Henry Kissinger has gone so far as to argue that competition over hydrocarbon resources will be the most likely cause for international conflict in coming years.2 China's hunt for oil is clearly influencing its foreign policy toward its neighbors, such as Russia, Japan, and the Central Asian states, and toward regions as far afield as sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.3 As China seeks access to global energy resources, its status as a rising power is already enabling it to exercise influence in ways that make it more difficult for the United States and the West to achieve their goals on a number of issues. The potentially explosive combination of a China less willing to passively accept U.S. leadership and the prospect of competition between China and other states for control over vital energy resources poses particularly critical challenges to U.S. interests in the Middle East. Chinese engagement in the Middle East has expanded economically, politically, and strategically over the last several years. Since the late 1990s, Beijing's policies toward the region have been closely linked to the objectives of the three major, state-owned Chinese energy companies—the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and CNOOC—to seek access to Middle Eastern oil and gas, frequently on an exclusive basis. Since 2002, the Middle East has become the leading arena for Beijing's efforts to secure effective ownership of critical hydrocarbon resources, rather than relying solely on international markets to meet China's energy import needs. There is every reason to anticipate that China will continue and even intensify its emphasis on the Middle East as part of its energy security strategy. China will likely keep working to expand its ties to the region's energy exporters over the next several years to ensure that it is not disadvantaged relative to other foreign customers and to maximize its access to hydrocarbon resources under any foreseeable circumstances, including possible military conflict with the United States. It seems doubtful that Chinese energy companies' fledgling efforts to lock up petroleum resources will succeed in keeping a critical mass of oil reserves off an increasingly integrated and fluid global oil market. Nevertheless, China's search for oil is making it a new competitor to the United States for influence in the Middle East. If not managed prudently, this competition will generate multiple points of bilateral friction and damage U.S. strategic interests in the region.

#### Chinese response to competition causes militarization of current resources on perception of competition over scarce resources

Samrei, 2011 [July 19th, Dr. Fariborz Saremi is a commentator on TV and radio (German ARD/NDR TV,SAT 1,N24, Voice of America and Radio Israel) on Middle East issues and a contributer to FreePressers.com, WorldTribune.com and Defense&Foreign Affairs. <http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/wtarc/2011/ea_china0895_07_19.asp>]

Thus, since China became a net oil importing country in 1993, its consumption of oil equivalents has surpassed those of the United States of America, making it the world’s number one energy consumer. China now consumes about 2,252 billion tons of oil equivalents compared to the U.S.’s 2,170 billion tons. Cleary this oil has to come from somewhere. Thus, since 1993 China has been pursuing a “go out” strategy, seeking to acquire energy assets abroad, primarily in Africa and the Middle East. Key suppliers of oil equivalents are now to be found in Angola, Saudi Arabia, and Iran whereas China gets much of its natural gas from Central Asia/the Caspian Basin pipelines and LNG shipments from Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Qatar. Concerned by fears that economic growth might lose momentum, Beijing, as represented by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), has increasingly sought energy suppliers and energy allies around the world. The Chinese government has been building a modern a grid of pipelines, roads, and railways for its energy supplies reviving routes that for centuries were reserved for silk. Furthermore, the Chinese government has increased usage of vital shipping routes to import oil. To add to the challenges Beijing faces, these sea routes are sensitive to several major threats. China is at pains not to antagonize the U.S. government by seeming to interfere with the large U.S. naval presence along these routes or by forcing the issue of Taiwan. The consequence of any clashes that might occur between U.S. American patrols and Chinese shipping could be either a naval embargo on Chinese oil supplies or worse a U.S. navy blockade of the Strait of Malacca, through which 80 percent of China’s oil imports pass. Moreover, the Strait is vulnerable to piracy. As a result, the Chinese regime is following a two-pronged policy. On the one hand, it has been militarizing its energy policies by building up its naval capabilities and spreading its naval presence across the Gulf of Aden and Southeast Asia. These efforts have been counterbalanced by the extension of overland pipelines to the Middle East. At the heart of the Chinese government’s efforts has been the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It has pursued President Hu Jintao’s determination to transform the former Silk Road into an Energy Road. The president has made securing oil a core element not only of economic welfare but also of nationalsecurity**,** since scarcity of resources is perceived as being a major threat to both. To achieve this, the SCO has been cultivating closer relations across Central Asia and the Caspian region and even with Russia. Chinese has focused on three main goals in this policy of integration and cooperation: firstly, to quell unrest in the Xingjiang province, home to Muslim-Uyghur separatist forces; secondly, to outflank any maritime embargoes by diversifying energy resources from the Persian Gulf; and lastly **to** protect Chinese hegemony across Eurasia. Via cooperation with Russia on integrating Afghanistan and Turkmenistan into SCO, China is seeking to strengthen economic integration, cooperation on energy, military, and security while ensuring stability against extremism, terrorism and separatism. SCO is also coordinating efforts to build an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Iran via Turkmenistan. China’s Strategy toward Cental Asia has become increasingly inclusive and expansive. Financial investment has been employed to create dependency and intensify cooperation in oil/gas production and supply and military affairs. Both China and Russia would like to see U.S. troops out of Central Asia and a vastly reduced American influence there. To this end China has signedseveral military agreements with Central Asian states and in doing so moved into Russia’s sphere of influence. Without a doubt Bejing will continue to pursue and expand these activities ensuring that it can secure its energy interests for the foreseeable future while cementing its political, commercial, and military influence.

#### The impact is nuclear war

Ross 09 [Robert S. Ross. Robert S. Ross is Professor of Political Science at Boston College and Associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University. His current research focuses on Chinese security policy, East Asian security, and U.S.-China relations.; International Security, The author is grateful to Robert Art, Dennis Blasko, Magnus Hjortdal, Kim Nødskov, and Øystein Tunsjø for their comments and suggestions. Among his recent publications are China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics; and Chinese Security Policy: Structure, Power, and Politics., Fall /09, "China's Naval Nationalism; Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response", lexis]

China's challenge to the maritime status quo would likely elicit a U.S. response that not only would offset China's buildup but also could contribute to costly U.S.-China tension. Nonetheless, following the onset of the global financial crisis and the U.S. recession in 2008, many Chinese nationalists believe that the United States is a declining power and that China has the opportunity to develop a powerful navy. 94 Moreover, they argue that China has "no choice but to build a navy centered on the aircraft carrier"; it cannot allow U.S. strategic advantages to inhibit Chinese naval planning. One author states, "If this logic prevails, if there came a time when the United States occupies a strategic location on the Chinese mainland, should China then be compelled not to develop an army?" 95 Chinese scholars acknowledge that the determination of the United States to protect its maritime supremacy could lead it to inflict a "Copenhagen" on the PLA Navy. 96 Nonetheless, China "should not be afraid of drawing fire against itself so that China's national security is completely constrained by external conditions and it is powerless." If the "hegemon" so "dreads Chinese naval power that it would launch a preventive attack, this simply proves . . . that China must definitely develop a powerful maritime force." 97 Ultimately, China's naval buildup could lead to U.S.-China tension that could exceed tension over Taiwan, but China "has to do what it has to do." It cannot "seek to please the United States. . . . Why should China build weapons that the United States does not care about?" Rather, it should build the very weapons that the United States "cares most about." 98

# Block

## K

### 2NC – Jackson [:25]

#### AND – alt has an external net benefit – structural violence – their focus on threats obscures causes of insecurity – only human security solves

Jackson 12—Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, the University of Otago. Former. Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University (8/5/12, Richard, The Great Con of National Security, http://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2012/08/05/the-great-con-of-national-security/)

It may have once been the case that being attacked by another country was a major threat to the lives of ordinary people. It may also be true that there are still some pretty serious dangers out there associated with the spread of nuclear weapons. For the most part, however, most of what you’ve been told about national security and all the big threats which can supposedly kill you is one big con designed to distract you from the things that can really hurt you, such as the poverty, inequality and structural violence of capitalism, global warming, and the manufacture and proliferation of weapons – among others.¶ The facts are simple and irrefutable: you’re far more likely to die from lack of health care provision than you are from terrorism; from stress and overwork than Iranian or North Korean nuclear missiles; from lack of road safety than from illegal immigrants; from mental illness and suicide than from computer hackers; from domestic violence than from asylum seekers; from the misuse of legal medicines and alcohol abuse than from international drug lords. And yet, politicians and the servile media spend most of their time talking about the threats posed by terrorism, immigration, asylum seekers, the international drug trade, the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, computer hackers, animal rights activism, the threat of China, and a host of other issues which are all about as equally unlikely to affect the health and well-being of you and your family. Along with this obsessive and perennial discussion of so-called ‘national security issues’, the state spends truly vast sums on security measures which have virtually no impact on the actual risk of dying from these threats, and then engages in massive displays of ‘security theatre’ designed to show just how seriously the state takes these threats – such as the x-ray machines and security measures in every public building, surveillance cameras everywhere, missile launchers in urban areas, drones in Afghanistan, armed police in airports, and a thousand other things. This display is meant to convince you that these threats are really, really serious.¶ And while all this is going on, the rulers of society are hoping that you won’t notice that increasing social and economic inequality in society leads to increased ill health for a growing underclass; that suicide and crime always rise when unemployment rises; that workplaces remain highly dangerous and kill and maim hundreds of people per year; that there are preventable diseases which plague the poorer sections of society; that domestic violence kills and injures thousands of women and children annually; and that globally, poverty and preventable disease kills tens of millions of people needlessly every year. In other words, they are hoping that you won’t notice how much structural violence there is in the world.¶ More than this, they are hoping that you won’t notice that while literally trillions of dollars are spent on military weapons, foreign wars and security theatre (which also arguably do nothing to make any us any safer, and may even make us marginally less safe), that domestic violence programmes struggle to provide even minimal support for women and children at risk of serious harm from their partners; that underfunded mental health programmes mean long waiting lists to receive basic care for at-risk individuals; that drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes lack the funding to match the demand for help; that welfare measures aimed at reducing inequality have been inadequate for decades; that health and safety measures at many workplaces remain insufficiently resourced; and that measures to tackle global warming and developing alternative energy remain hopelessly inadequate.¶ Of course, none of this is surprising. Politicians are a part of the system; they don’t want to change it. For them, all the insecurity, death and ill-health caused by capitalist inequality are a price worth paying to keep the basic social structures as they are. A more egalitarian society based on equality, solidarity, and other non-materialist values would not suit their interests, or the special interests of the lobby groups they are indebted to. It is also true that dealing with economic and social inequality, improving public health, changing international structures of inequality, restructuring the military-industrial complex, and making the necessary economic and political changes to deal with global warming will be extremely difficult and will require long-term commitment and determination. For politicians looking towards the next election, it is clearly much easier to paint immigrants as a threat to social order or pontificate about the ongoing danger of terrorists. It is also more exciting for the media than stories about how poor people and people of colour are discriminated against and suffer worse health as a consequence.¶ Viewed from this vantage point, national security is one massive confidence trick – misdirection on an epic scale. Its primary function is to distract you from the structures and inequalities in society which are the real threat to the health and wellbeing of you and your family, and to convince you to be permanently afraid so that you will acquiesce to all the security measures which keep you under state control and keep the military-industrial complex ticking along.¶ Keep this in mind next time you hear a politician talking about the threat of uncontrolled immigration, the risk posed by asylum seekers or the threat of Iran, or the need to expand counter-terrorism powers. The question is: when politicians are talking about national security, what is that they don’t want you to think and talk about? What exactly is the misdirection they are engaged in? The truth is, if you think that terrorists or immigrants or asylum seekers or Iran are a greater threat to your safety than the capitalist system, you have been well and truly conned, my friend. Don’t believe the hype: you’re much more likely to die from any one of several forms of structural violence in society than you are from immigrants or terrorism. Somehow, we need to challenge the politicians on this fact.

### 2NC – V2L

#### Destroys value to life

Dillon 96 [Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought, p. 26]

Everything, for example, has now become possible. But what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of its actions is to turn itself into a species; not merely an animal species, nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount to the same thing), but a mere species of calculation. For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation does it seem capable of constructing that political arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought insists upon, and which a world made increasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seems to require. Yet, the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human freedom, inducing either despair or the surrender of what is human to the de-humanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security. I think, then, that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surrender itself to so-called laws of necessity (calculability itself) which would make everything possible. That it was, in short, characterised by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. But I also think that things have gone one stage further—the surrender to the necessity of realising everything that is possible—and that this found its paradigmatic expression, for example, in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War; where everything up to and including self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security. This logic persists in the metaphysical core of modern politics—the axioms of inter-State security relations, popularised, for example, through strategic discourse— even if the details have changed.

### 2NC – Framework [Bilgin]

#### T

#### Vote negative to endorse critique - security is an epistemologically flawed concept – rejecting critical theory for policy-oriented methodologies ensures violent conflict - rejection and rethinking are necessary to ethical change

Shampa Biswas 7 Prof of Politics @ Whitman “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) p. 117-125

The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected makes this a particularly opportune, if not necessary, moment, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart ofa discipline ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in Orientalism has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academicscholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholarswhose very business it is to think about global politicstoactuallythink globally and politically.What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IRscholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this contexthas become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage inbureaucraticrole-playing, minor academic turf battlesmask thelarger managerialpower play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at andamong numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectivesand interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible andjustified throughvarious forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger questionof intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to payparticular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

### 2NC – Democracy

#### Focus on democracy in order to create global peace paradoxically ensures total war that wipes out billions

**-** Burke ‘7(Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 231-2]

Yet the first act in America's 'forward strategy of freedom' was to invade and attempt to subjugate Iraq, suggesting that, if 'peace' is its object, its means is war: the engine of history is violence, on an enormous and tragic scale, and violence is ultimately its only meaning. This we can glimpse in 'Toward a Pacific Union', a deeply disingenuous chapter of Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man. This text divides the earth between a 'post-historical' world of affluent developed democracies where 'the old rules of power-politics have decreasing relevance', and a world still 'stuck in history' and 'riven with a variety of religious, national and ideological conflicts'. The two worlds will maintain 'parallel but separate existences' and interact only along axes of threat, disturbance and crucial strategic interest: oil, immigration, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Because 'the relationship between democracies and nondemocracies will still be characterised by mutual distrust and fear', writes Fukuyama, the 'post-historical half must still make use of realist methods when dealing with the part still in history ... force will still be the ultima ratio in their relations'. For all the book's Kantian pretensions, Fukuyama naturalises war and coercion as the dominant mode of dealing with billions of peopledefined only through their lack of 'development' and 'freedom'. Furthermore, in his advocacy of the 'traditional moralism of American foreign policy' and his dismissal of the United Nations in favour of a NATO-style 'league of truly free states ... capable of much more forceful action to protect its collective security against threats arising from the non-democratic part of the world' we can see an early premonition of the historicist unilateralism of the Bush administration. 72 In this light, we can see the invasion of Iraq as continuing a long process of 'world-historical' violence that stretches back to Columbus' discovery of the Americas, and the subsequent politics of genocide, warfare and dispossession through which the modem United States was created and then expanded - initially with the colonisation of the Philippines and coercive trade relationships with China and Japan, and eventually to the self-declared role Luce had argued so forcefully for: guarantor of global economic and strategic order after 1945. This role involved the hideous destruction of Vietnam and Cambodia, 'interventions' in Chile, El Salvador, Panama, Nicaragua and Afghanistan (or an ever more destructive 'strategic' involvement in the Persian Gulf that saw the United States first building up Iraq as a formidable regional military power, and then punishing its people with a 14-year sanctions regime that caused the deaths of at least 200,000 people), all of which we are meant to accept as proof of America's benign intentions, of America putting its 'power at the service of principle'. They are merely history working itself out, the 'design of nature' writing its bliss on the world.73 The bliss 'freedom' offers us, however, is the bliss of the graveyard, stretching endlessly into a world marked not by historical perfection or democratic peace, but by the eternal recurrence of tragedy, as ends endlessly disappear in the means of permanent war and permanent terror. This is how we must understand both the prolonged trauma visited on the people of Iraq since 1990, and the inflammatory impact the US invasion will have on the new phenomenon of global antiWestern terrorism. American exceptionalism has deluded US policymakers into believing that they are the only actors who write history, who know where it is heading, and how it will play out, and that in its service it is they (and no-one else) who assume an unlimited freedom to act. As a senior adviser to Bush told a journalist in 2002: 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality . . We're history's actors."

### 2NC – Terrorism – Ahmed (Shortish)

#### The 1AC constructs terrorism through a paranoid fantasy of Islomophobia – those who do not fit into the American order are exterminated ensuring endless genocide – your ballot should be used as an ethical judgment against the racism that underpins the aff

Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, . Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex, 2012, “Islamophobia and Insecurity The Exclusionary Logic of Imperial Geopolitics”, PDF, KENTUCKY

* Islamophobia pervades social structures and determines truth
* Amounts to genocide – 3 million Muslims dead only in Iraq – 100:1 ratio
* Destroys democracy and leads to militarization of society to confront the Islam threat
* Epistemological interrogation is key – must question the social structures constructed by the State

A range of studies indicate that these diverse phenomena affecting Muslim communities are in fact facets of a single overall social process, conveyed through the concept of Islamophobia.18 While sociological debate on the conceptual utility and coherence of Islamophobia continues, the increasing prevalence of prejudice and discrimination toward Muslim diasporas in the West over the last two decades is testament to the reality of the phenomena it is supposed to capture – whether or not the term is truly accurate as a sociological concept. The idea of Islamophobia conveys the sense of a distinctive form of racism and bigotry targeted specifically at members of Muslim communities, reinforced by negative stereotypes about Islam. In 1997, the Runnymede Trust offered its seminal definition of Islamophobia as a set of attitudes: Islam is perceived as a static, unchanging monolithic block; it is separate and “other”; it lacks values in common with other culture; is inferior to the West; and is irrational, primitive, sexist, violent, aggressive, and supportive of terrorism. Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices against Muslims and the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society, such that anti- Muslim hostility becomes normalised.19 In 2004, the Council of Europe defined Islamophobia as “the fear of or prejudiced viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims and matters pertaining to them. Whether it takes the shape of daily forms of racism and discrimination or more violent forms, Islamophobia is a violation of human rights and a threat to social cohesion.”20 However, as Maussen points out, there are important theoretical reservations for the use of the catch- all term Islamophobia to encompass so many diverse phenomena. Primarily, the term “groups 3 together all kinds of different forms of discourse, speech and acts, by suggesting that they all emanate from an identical ideological core, which is a „fear‟ or a „phobia‟ of Islam.” This amounts to a form of ideological reductionism which, however, fails to offer any further or deeper explanation of why this irrational fear of Islam has come about, and how it refracts through myriad different social structures into such a wide array of different exclusionary behaviours and processes. Thus, Maussen notes that while “these different kinds of discourse and speech” – such as negative media portrayals of Muslims, legislation impacting primarily or inordinately on Muslims, and sporadic acts of public violence against Muslims – may well be “related and feed into one another, but we cannot simply equate them all and treat them as comparable illustrations of a core ideology named „Islamophobia.‟” There is therefore a need to “distinguish speech and discourse on the one hand, from acts on the other hand.” While discourse and speech may be demeaning, it should not be conflated with “policies which limit the religious freedoms of Muslims, or with acts of violence, such as burning mosques or attacking Muslim girls who wear the headscarf.”21 This sort of critical evaluation of the application of the term Islamophobia raises important issues highlighting the underdevelopment of the concept as a sociological category capable of providing a credible theoretical explanatory framework by which to understand the diverse phenomena of anti- Muslim hostility and discrimination. Clearly, while there may be compelling reason to conclude that many of these phenomena are indeed motivated by a general irrational fear of Islam and Muslims – the causal origins of this irrational mindset are largely ignored in the literature that endorses the concept of Islamophobia. Furthermore, if such an ideological mindset is presumed to be the fundamental problem, how this mindset manages to encompass such a diversity of processes, institutions and behaviours not only in a single society, but indeed across multiple societies simultaneously, remains unexplained. In effect, Islamophobia becomes a self-reinforcing circular concept, in which anti-Muslim hostility is generated by nothing more than an irrational hostility toward Muslims – effectively, Islamophobia creates Islamophobia. Although the conceptual definitions and theoretical efficacy of Islamophobia is therefore still hotly contested in academic literature, it is indisputable that there has been a meteoric rise in anti-Muslim hostility and discrimination on a global scale. According to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, which has monitored this phenomenon since 2001, Islamophobia in the form of discrimination and violence specifically toward members of Muslim diaspora communities in the EU has increased dramatically. In particular, anti-Muslim prejudice in EU countries is manifest not simply in regressive ideological perspectives leading to acts of violence, but also in tangible exclusionary patterns in housing, education, and employment.22 A report co-sponsored by the University of California, Berkeley, Center for Race and Gender, similarly found evidence that Islamophobia in the US is an increasingly powerful force in the political landscape, negatively affecting Muslims in terms of employment, education, and housing, as well as hate crimes and profiling by security agencies.23 The overall picture is of an increasing sense of unease, fear and hostility between Muslims and non- Muslims over the last decade. Overwhelmingly, this has coincided with a mainstream media narrative in which Islam and Muslims are increasingly projected as “a threat to traditional British customs, values and ways of life”, because “there is no common ground between the West and Islam.”24 Another study by Cardiff University‟s School of Journalism, analyzing UK press coverage of British Muslims from 2000 to 2008, found that “the bulk of coverage of British Muslims – around two thirds – focuses on Muslims as a threat (in relation to terrorism), a problem (in terms of differences in values) or both (Muslim extremism in general).” Further, it concluded that: “Four of the five most common discourses used about Muslims in the British press associate Islam/Muslims with threats, 4 problems or in opposition to dominant British values.”25 A similar study of Islamophobia in the American media concluded that “media stereotyping” after 9/11 “primed Americans to understand the 9/11 attacks as representative of Arab political culture and Islamic devotion,” and was “an important factor in the backlash that afflicted these communities post-9/11.” The study further documents an “alarming deterioration in Islamophobic hate speech in the media” up to 2006.26 A 2008 World Economic Forum study of the way „Muslim-West‟ relations are covered across global media in a total of 24 Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority countries found that “negative coverage was 10 times more frequent than positive coverage” with Muslims being “associated with fundamentalist and extremist activities more than six times as often as other religious protagonists.”27 The corporate media‟s increasing demonization of Islam and Muslims is not occurring in a silo, but is being driven very much by the agendas of government and security agencies. On the one hand, the corporate media relies relatively uncritically on government and security agencies for its information on foreign policy and intelligence matters, including terrorism.28 On the other, there have been direct efforts from security agencies to influence the media. Since 1990, for instance, the Pentagon has bribed, pressured, and censored Hollywood film-makers to adapt story lines to support its propaganda.29 Reviewing over a thousand Hollywood movies, Jack Shaheen, Professor Emeritus of Mass Communication at Southern-Illinois University, found that: “Today‟s image makers regularly link the Islamic faith with male supremacy, holy war, and acts of terror, depicting Arab Muslims as hostile alien intruders, and as lecherous, oily sheikhs, intent on using nuclear weapons. When mosques are displayed onscreen, the camera inevitably cuts to Arabs praying, and then gunning down civilians.”30 Here, the mainstream media plays a critical function in ideologically linking the international to the domestic, in particular, the trajectory of Western foreign policy in Muslim-majority theatres across the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as the processes of Islamophobia and radicalisation experienced within Muslim diaspora communities in the West. On the one hand, Islamophobic media narratives buttress anti-Muslim public opinion at home, alienating Muslims and fuelling the extremist rhetoric of far right groups. Simultaneously, images of devastation and destruction from Muslim-majority theatres of war such as Iraq and Afghanistan also distress and anger Muslim diaspora communities, further exacerbating alienation. In effect, the media acts as a symbiotic link between Islamophobia at home and abroad, as it mediates extremist rhetoric from neoconservative and right-wing factions and the official language of government and security agencies who attempt to pander to Islamophobic public opinion on political issues such as immigration and terrorism. Thus, there is perhaps no clearer instantiation of the security-dynamics of Islamophobia than the actual activities of Western security agencies. After the US Department of Justice passed a regulation allowing indefinite detention on 20th September 2001, nearly 1,200 Arabs and Muslims were secretly arrested and detained without charge.31 The US National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) “call-in” program required male visitors from twenty-four Arab and Muslim countries and North Korea to register with INS offices. No terrorists were found, yet over 13,000 of the 80,000 men who registered were threatened with deportation, and many were “detained in harsh conditions.”32 In the UK, more than a thousand Muslims have been detained without charge under anti-terror laws, out of which only a handful have been convicted of terrorist offences. Worldwide, more than 100,000 Muslim men – victims of the CIA‟s extraordinary rendition programme – are being detained without charges “in secretive American-run jails and interrogation centres similar to the notorious Abu Ghraib Prison” under conditions which violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners, and UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.33 5 Such practices accompany Anglo-American military engagements in predominantly Muslim theatres of war, regions often described as dangerous failed zones harbouring potential Islamist terrorists planning to inflict apocalyptic forms of mass destruction on Western civilization.34 Such military engagements also tend to result in the indiscriminate killings of predominantly Muslim civilians, and correlate invariably with their strategic location vis-à-vis contested energy reserves in the Middle East, Central Asia and Northwest Africa. Iraq provides a case-in-point. From 1991 to 2007, the total civilian death toll in Iraq as a direct and indirect consequence of Anglo-American invasions, socio-economic deprivation, infrastructure destruction, and occupation amounts to approximately 3 million over a period of sixteen years.35 The scale of this violence is thus larger than some of the most well-known cases of twentieth century genocide such as in Cambodia, Kampuchea, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. As Walt points out, estimating the number of Muslims killed directly and indirectly by U.S. forces over the last 30 years suggests at least 100 Muslim fatalities for every US one. He thus observes: “When you kill tens of thousands of people in other countries – and sometimes for no good reason – you shouldn‟t be surprised when people in those countries are enraged by this behavior and interested in revenge.”36 This argument amply refutes the assumption that foreign policy has no relationship to terrorism and violent radicalisation. In particular, taking a broader historical view of the continuity of US-UK interventionism in the Gulf region going back to 1991 demonstrates not only the immense scale of the violence inflicted upon Iraqi civilians, but also illustrates that British interventionism in the region preceded the emergence and proliferation of Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks against Western targets. Thus, Ralph argues that the massive military violence that has been inflicted predominantly on the civilian populations of Muslim-majority regions is only possible by their having been “Islamophobically” constructed as having lives that are of less value compared to those of Western citizens.37 But while the irrational fear of Islam and Muslims is clearly a significant factor in all these disparate phenomena, Islamophobia as a sociological concept offers little by way of a coherent causal explanation of how or why these phenomena are escalating simultaneously. Islamophobia as Securitization It is therefore imperative to recognize that Islamophobia is distinctive precisely as a unique form of securitization targeted specifically at Muslim communities in the context of the particular objectives, interests and anxieties of powerful political actors. Indeed, Islamophobia cannot be understood as a sociological category without situating it in the context of the evolving socio-political relations of global imperialism, which in turn explain the political dynamic of the securitization of Muslim communities. Wæver‟s seminal concept of securitisation referred to a „speech act‟ – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify an existential threat to the state which, because of its extreme nature, justifies moving beyond conventional security measures within the public rule of law, thus permitting the execution of extra-legal emergence powers that are henceforth “above politics.”38 Thus, Buzan et. al argued that “the priority and the urgency of an existential threat” permits the state resort to consistent “violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed.” Securitisation thus legitimises the state of exception and the suspension of democracy.39 6 In the early 1990s, Willy Claes, then NATO Secretary-General identified “Islamic fundamentalism” as a new threat to Western Europe replacing the defunct USSR.40 By the late 1990s, a number of hearings had been held in the Congress and Senate on the Islamist threat from the Middle East and Central Asia.41 The publication of Samuel Huntington‟s influential thesis on the clash of civilizations was a decisive turning-point in the solidification of this strategic thinking.42 After 9/11, security agencies increasingly generalized the threat of Islamist terrorism as being, despite its marginality, nevertheless widely dispersed throughout Muslim communities, necessitating comprehensive regimes of surveillance, policing and in some regions counterinsurgency. A sensitive briefing paper published by the Pentagon agency, Counterintelligence Field Activity (which operated from 2002 to 2008, after which its activities were subsumed by the Defense Intelligence Agency), argued that “political Islam wages an ideological battle against the non-Islamic world at the tactical, operational and strategic level. The West‟s response is focused at the tactical and operation level, leaving the strategic level – Islam – unaddressed.” The paper concludes that “Islam is an ideological engine of war (Jihad),” and “no one is looking for its off switch” due to political “indecision [over] whether Islam is radical or being radicalized.” Attempting to review the Qur‟an and Prophetic traditions, the paper infers that “Strategic themes suggest Islam is radical by nature... Muhammad‟s behaviors today would be defined as radical.” Western policymakers can no longer afford to overlook the “cult characteristics of Islam.” Indeed even Islam‟s advocacy of charity – the principle known as Zakat considered an obligatory „pillar‟ of Islam – is described as “an asymmetrical war-fighting funding mechanism.” The only reason that the US has failed to suffer scattered insurgent terrorist attacks – as opposed to the single, concentrated and catastrophic attack of 9/11 – is primarily due to its relatively small Muslim population. Accordingly, the threat of such insurgency will increase as the Muslim minority grows and gains more influence. The Pentagon cites successful and attempted terrorist attacks in Britain, along with the predominantly Muslim riots in France, as examples.43 Thus, Tim Savage, division chief at the State Department‟s Office of European Analysis argues that Europe‟s Muslim population is expected to double while its non-Muslim population is projected to fall by at least 3.5 per cent. At worse, he speculates that by mid-century Muslims might outnumber non-Muslims not only in France, but throughout Western Europe. European intelligence analysts already estimate that up to 2 per cent of the continent‟s Muslims – half a million people – are involved in extremist activity. This number, for which no corroborating evidence exists, is so huge according to Savage not because of the role of Islamic fundamentalism per se, but rather simply due to the inevitable “chemistry resulting from Muslims‟ encounter with Europe [which] seems to make certain individuals more susceptible to recruitment into terrorist activities.” Therefore, he implies, terrorists are supposedly born simply from the identity crisis generated by Muslim immigration to Europe – “A larger group of terrorists by far is recruited from the masses of young men, many of them middle- class, who experience a sort of culture shock in Europe and become radicalized „born again‟ Islamists.”44 Security agencies are preoccupied with population politics not only in the context of the alleged dangers posed by the rising number of Muslims in the US, Britain and Western Europe, but also in terms of rising populations in the South in general, and intensifying population movements toward the West as people attempt to escape the calamities created by climate change, food insecurity and resource scarcity. In this sense, security agencies project a direct connection between the question of civil unrest, global crises and rising populations of „Others‟, particularly Muslims. According to then-CIA Director Michael V. Hayden, rising world population and immigration “could undermine the stability of some of the world‟s most fragile states, especially in Africa, while in the 7 West, governments will be forced to grapple with ever larger immigrant communities and deepening divisions over ethnicity and race.” Noting the projected 33 percent growth in global population over the next 40 years, he warned that regional friendly oil-exporting regimes “like Niger and Libya will be forced to rapidly find food, shelter and jobs for millions, or deal with restive populations that „could be easily attracted to violence, civil unrest, or extremism.‟” Corroborating the fears described above, he added that rising world population would also have a debilitating impact within the West due to growing ethnicity differentials between shrinking and expanding population groups: “European countries, many of which already have large immigrant communities, will see particular growth in their Muslim populations while the number of non-Muslims will shrink as birthrates fall. „Social integration of immigrants will pose a significant challenge to many host nations – again boosting the potential for unrest and extremism,‟ Hayden said.”45 Furthermore, Muslim communities – both in the form of diasporas in the West and Muslim-majority countries in strategic regions of the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa – are perceived to cut across the faultlines of increasingly complex non-traditional security challenges such as climate change, energy depletion, water shortages and food insecurity. A recent US Army War College study makes reference to Huntington‟s clash thesis, arguing that while it “captured the possibilities” already emerging in the 1990s: “... the future and its implications are even darker than what Professor Huntington suggested.... The confluence between the world‟s greatest reserves of petroleum and the extraordinary difficulties that the Islamic world is having, and will continue to have, in confronting a civilization that has taken the West 900 years to develop will create challenges that strategists are only now beginning to grasp.”46 In other words, there is a direct link between Western energy interests, the „War on Terror‟, and the West‟s military pre-occupation with the Muslim world. For example, the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of „the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents‟, the report concludes that „The implications for future conflict are ominous.‟47 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: „In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s‟, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. „Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.‟48 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable „youth bulge‟ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent, and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to „endemic unemployment‟ will be channelled through „political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces.‟49 8 The Exclusionary Logic of Securitization Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrates how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order – that is, who are anathema to imperial interests. Due to the geopolitical significance of Muslim-majority regions to imperial interests and their links to Muslim diasporas in the West, this securitization process overwhelmingly focuses on the externalisation of Muslims. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of Islamophobia is insufficient to understand its causal dynamics. For the mere identification of a security issue does not necessarily corresponding to an objective threat, but represents the interests of power. This also means that the state of exception cannot simply be unilaterally decreed by the sovereign, but that the act of speech must conform to a normative grammar of security by a position of authority speaking to an audience that understands and is convinced by this act. Thus, the specific socio-political relations that lead to securitisation are under- theorised. As McDonald points out: “The potential for security to be constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and representations is not addressed, and the question of why particular representations resonate with relevant constituencies is under‐theorized.”50 He notes that questions like “Why are some political communities more likely to view certain actors and dynamics as threatening? What role do narratives of history, culture and identity have in underpinning or legitimating particular forms of securitization?” are obscured.51 Yet answers to such questions must go beyond a form of discourse-reductionism focusing exclusively on „narratives of history, cultural and identity‟, to explore the political economy with which these narratives are co-extensive. As Doug Stokes points out: “While the WoT [„War on Terror‟] is undoubtedly a discursive complex whereby modes of representation about terrorism, non-Western populations and the construction of stark boundaries (you are either with us or with the terrorists) operate to exclude and include, it is also intimately bound up with political and economic processes... Specifically, the wars launched in the name of counter-terrorism are not purely driven by certain hegemonic discourses, but are also part of the West‟s economic interests in oil, strategic interests in military bases in the Middle East and the desire to maintain American hegemony into the twenty-first century by controlling one of the crucial resource-rich regions for global capitalism.”52 In other words, the hegemonic construction of exclusionary discourses is always inherently politically-constituted, and therefore by the same token, politically-embedded and politically- transformative. Rather than securitisation only justifying the suspension of law to pave the way for exceptional measures outside the political, contemporary security constructions of „Islam‟ and „Muslims‟ show that it can also lead to a form of governmentality that permanently transforms the way in which populations are politically managed and reproduced.53 The Paris school of Security Studies thus points out that securitisation is equally about risk management, actively conducted by security professionals working across multiple social bureaucracies in the army, intelligence services, police forces, border controls, defence companies, insurance firms, and so on. Their activities construct “regimes of truth” which draw on “numerical data and statistics, technologies of biometrics and sociological profiles of potential dangerous behaviour” to “determine what exactly constitutes 9 security”, and whose expertise empowers them to advise state-leaders.54 Securitisation therefore “works through everyday technologies, through the effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional, through political struggles, and especially through institutional competition within the professional security field in which the most trivial interests are at stake.”55 The Paris school thus highlights that the state-level „speech act‟ privileged by the Copenhagen school cannot simply appear ex-nihilo as a discursive rupture that innovates a completely new „regime of truth‟, but must emerge from prior „normal‟ political processes therefore amplifying pre-existing exclusionary „regimes of truth‟ in new directions. Yet while identifying the role of “interests”, “institutional competition” and the status of the “professional security field”, the Paris schools offers no exploration of the concrete political and economic structures by which these are constituted, and how they thus interact with and relate to the operation of state power. By what socio-political relations is the expertise of security professionals privileged and sanctioned by the state? What historically- specific social conditions prompt the construction of exclusionary „regimes of truth‟ through processes of everyday political institutional struggles, as well as through extraordinary acts of state- level decisionism enforcing exceptional measures? Furthermore, the sharp theoretical distinction between the Copenhagen and Paris schools collapses in the face of historical and empirical reality. Anti-Western terrorist attacks such as 9/11 prompt state- level emergency responses which, justified by the perception of unprecedented threat, lead to adoption of extraordinary military and police responses. Yet these responses do not merely suspend constitutional law in the face of emergency – they establish permanence precisely through exploiting the declared state of emergency to legitimise the institutionalisation of exceptional measures within the body politic, thus purporting to permanently transform the constitutional order. Securitisation, in other words, can lead to wholesale militarisation of society. Of course, this is not to suggest that the suspension of elements of the constitutional order leading to its permanent transformation amounts to a wholesale annulment of democracy. Rather, this process of militarisation encompasses the progressive institutionalisation of exceptional extra-constitutional measures – this undermines the democratic system on security grounds, and continually threatens to subvert it further. Yet what remains unanswered here is the very nature of the political processes that drive securitisation, their institutional origin, and the socio-political relations by which they are constituted. Ultimately, the most significant underlying causal factor is a deepening perception of fundamental social crisis. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of whom destroys the other on the basis of a pre-eminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different.56 In Hinton‟s words: “Genocides are distinguished by a process of „othering‟ in which the boundaries of an imagined community are reshaped in such a manner that a previously „included‟ group (albeit often included only tangentially) is ideologically recast (almost always in dehumanizing rhetoric) as being outside the community, as a threatening and dangerous „other‟ – whether racial, political, ethnic, religious, economic, and so on – that must be annihilated.”57 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and „Otherised‟ in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups 10 as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of „inclusion‟, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.58 This recalls Lemkin‟s recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally conjoined to a wider socio- political project – or colonial project – designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives, can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable.59 Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated socio-political crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new „outsider‟ group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.60 This does not imply that the current logic of securitisation is necessarily genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind contemporary mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the break-down of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed „outsider‟ group vindicating various forms of violence. Conclusions Widespread government and public anxieties about the overlapping dangers of global recession, environmental degradation, resource depletion, food price inflation, violent conflict, terrorism, and so on, can often translate into a mistrust of prevailing institutions and norms. Depending on one‟s political orientation, this can lead to the projection of those anxieties onto specific institutions, norms, or even social groups. It is in this context that historians of mass violence point out that the processes that lead to genocide invariably commence with the eruption of social crisis generating radical uncertainty, which is subliminally resolved by projection of blame onto social groups who begin to be constructed as outsiders. Their extermination, partial or otherwise, is thus increasingly viewed as a „final solution‟ by which the perpetrator group exculpates itself and psychologically alleviates its anxieties about entrenched crises.61 In the contemporary global context, the securitization of Islam and Muslims driving the entrenchment of Islamophobia is itself being driven by a deepening perception of social crises at multiple levels of society, vindicating the sense of a fundamental failure of prevailing institutions and values. At the level of defence planning, the pre-9/11 official recognition of an ongoing and inevitable decline in U.S. hegemony has been compounded by the emergence and prevalence of non-traditional security challenges whose dynamic has been accelerated precisely by the normal functioning of the US.- dominate global political economy. The strategic imperative throughout the „War on Terror‟ to shore11 up an increasingly beleaguered U.S. hegemony through domination of the world‟s critical energy resources and transhipment routes has in turn focused the imaginations of security agencies on the problematic role of Muslim-majority regions. Simultaneously, the institutionalization of this paranoia about the security threat potentially posed by Islam and Muslims in the form of wide-ranging new domestic police-powers – combined with the corporate media‟s normalization of mass military violence in Muslim-majority regions as „par for the course‟ required to defend Western civilization against terrorism – has generated a parallel paranoia throughout Western societies. This irrational paranoia grows increasingly targeted and dangerous as global ecological, energy and economic crises – largely systemic in origin – continue to undermine the social fabric, to the impotence of the conventional paraphernalia of the Western political bureaucracy. This further fuels both government and public anxieties, and intensifies the securitization processes that drive the social polarisation of insider and outsider groups, of which Muslims are the focal point. In this context, does the conduct of actual Anglo-American military engagements in Muslim-majority regions, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Algeria, and so on, indicate an Islamophobic „Muslim- centric‟ dynamic to such practices, evincing a tendentially genocidal logic, or is the systematic targeting of largely Muslim groups simply an accident of geopolitical interest? This discussion suggests that the answer is both. Processes of „Otherization‟ due to securitization tend to become increasingly radicalized on the ground precisely in the context of increasingly violent socio-political contestations and social crisis. It is not a far cry to suggest that US wars in Muslim-majority theatres of war are therefore undergoing a process of radicalization, fuelled by both the difficulty and entrenchment of conflict in for instance Afghanistan and Pakistan, the terrorism that conflict inevitably generates, as well as the systemic non-traditional security challenges such as food, water and economic problems increasingly afflicting Muslim-majority regions. This, of course, brings us to the thorny question, given our reference to the genocide literature, of how to conceptualize the intentional dynamic of much of this violence, particularly given that it often involves massive and indiscriminate killings of predominantly Muslim civilians. These killings are not only “degenerate” in Shaw‟s sense of the foreseeable, tacitly-condoned collateral damage of technologized ways of war designed to minimize Western military casualties.62 They often include confirmed episodes of deliberate targeting of civilians as an integral strategy of war. Congressional testimony of US Army combat veterans in Iraq, for example, refers to “free fire orders... described by the Soldiers who had been deployed during the invasion as coming from their commanders who told them „kill everything that moves‟ which included all civilians.”63 Even episodes of violence largely attributed to US incompetence may be more problematic, requiring more detailed empirical determination. Iraq expert Toby Dodge for instance emphasises that a substantive portion of civilian deaths in Iraq are due to the escalation of violent sectarian conflict under the “complete collapse” of the administrative and coercive capacities of the Iraqi state, for which he primarily blames “the United States‟ inability to reconstruct them.”64 Yet his analysis overlooks compelling evidence that at least to some degree, US forces intentionally brought about this collapse and exacerbated sectarian divisions as a strategy to weaken Iraq‟s capacity for self- determination, thereby consolidating its dependence on US security forces and legitimizing a permanent de facto occupation. Several credible journalistic and intelligence investigations argue that elements of the Bush administration envisaged a forcible division of Iraq along ethno-religious lines from the outset of its war-planning, and that for some years the US actively financed an eclectic panoply of Shi‟ite death squads and Sunni insurgents, both prime culprits in sectarian violence.65 Cook, in this vein, suggests that at least in part the sectarian chaos in Iraq and the Middle East is the intended outcome of an imperial strategy of „divide-and-rule.‟66 12 On the other hand, clear differences in US and British approaches further complexify the picture and underscore again the need for a nuanced approach. While US forces in Afghanistan frequently call on air support, which has resulted in indiscriminate bombings of Afghan civilians; British forces have adopted precisely the opposite strategy, preferring to work on the ground and explicitly minimizing reliance on air support precisely to try to minimize Afghan civilian casualties with a view to increase popular support. In other words, even while at some level it seems plausible that Islamophobic processes of „Otherization‟ due to securitization are at work, the dynamic of violence cannot be simplistically reduced to this, and each conflict on the ground generates its own specific trajectories that require careful explanation. It would therefore be premature and unwarranted to causally reduce these disparate phenomena – the military violence of the „War on Terror‟ in foreign theatres in Muslim-majority regions, its domestic corollary in counter-terror police-powers focusing largely on Muslim diasporas, and the escalation of exclusionary paranoia and hostility toward Islam and Muslims from Western mainstream institutions – to an amorphous conception of „Islamophobia‟. While these processes should not simply be theorized as a single continuum of imperial Islamophobic violence tending potentially toward genocidal conduct, it is equally mistaken to ignore the fact that these phenomena are intimately interrelated. This interrelation can only be understood in the context of the imperial socio-political relations of securitization – the deepening perception of social and global crisis, and the projection of anxieties toward these crises onto the geopolitical faultlines of an increasingly fragile U.S.-dominated global political economy, which happen to cross Muslim-majority regions of the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa. While contemporary Islamophobia, then, encompasses these different domestic and global processes, it is itself in some ways merely an ideological symptom of a global Western civilization that is in many ways coming apart at the seams. Yet increasingly, the symptom is itself feeding back on and radicalizing the dynamic of the systemic processes by which it is generated. The overwhelming danger is that if present trends in the international system are permitted to continue – the normalization of imperial military violence abroad, the legitimization of draconian policing at home, and the unravelling of social relations due to the intensification of socio-political and economic crisis – these trends may well begin to culminate in increasingly genocidal outcomes.

### DA Proper

#### Supplying components – proves interest — cross -x

Jeff Franks (Staff writer, journalist), 1-19-12, Reuters, “Oil rig arrives for Cuba offshore exploration work,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/us-cuba-oil-rig-idUSTRE80I1WV20120119

The rig, known as Scarabeo 9, could be seen as it sailed slowly westward, miles off the north coast and Havana's famed Malecon seaside boulevard. Its arrival went mostly unnoticed by people in the capital, but it was a long-awaited and landmark day for the island's oil industry, which believes the platform will tap into rich oil fields in Cuba's part of the Gulf of Mexico. Starting next week, Spanish oil giant Repsol YPF, working in partnership with Norway's Statoil and ONGC Videsh, a unit of India's Oil and Natural Gas Corp, is expected to drill at least two wells in Cuban waters about 70 miles from the Florida Keys. Malaysia's Petronas, in partnership with Russia's Gazprom Neft, will also drill a well using the Scarabeo 9. The rig has been contracted from its owner Saipem, a unit of Italian oil company Eni. All the wells will be in water at least a mile deep, like that of the BP well that blew out and spilled millions of gallons of oil in the U.S. part of the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Cuba has said it may have 20 billion barrels of oil in its parts of the Gulf, but the U.S. Geological Survey has estimated about 5 billion. Repsol drilled the only previous offshore well in Cuba in 2004 and said it found oil, but said it was not "commercial." It has been trying for several years to bring another rig for more drilling, a task that was complicated by the longstanding U.S. trade embargo against Cuba and the limits it places on the amount of U.S. technology that can be used. The Scarabeo 9, a semi-submersible rig that floats on four giant pontoon legs and has living quarters for more than 200 crewmembers, was built in China, then sent to Singapore in late 2010 for completion.

## Cuban Econ

#### Past deterioration disproves the impact

Carmelo Mesa-Lago 9, Economist, (“ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BALANCE OF 50 YEARS OF CUBAN REVOLUTION”, <http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume19/pdfs/mesolago.pdf>, AW)

Out of a total 84 indicators in Tables 1–3, 29 related to the domestic economy, 19 to the external sector, and 36 to social issues. Between 1957 and 2008, per- formance worsened with respect to 66% of domestic economic indicators and improved with respect to 34%, with the best performances in mining; between 1989 and 2008, 72% of those indicators were well be- low the pre-crisis level, while 28% were above. With regard to the external sector, approximately half of the indicators improved between 1957 and 2007 and the other half worsened; whereas 63% in 2008 showed lower performance than their pre-crisis level and 37% showed higher performance. The best performance was in social indicators: between 1957 and 2008, 76% showed improvement and only 24% worsened; but in 2008, 52% were below the pre-crisis level and only 48% had surpassed such level.

Cuba’s performance was overwhelmingly negative with respect to the economic indicators: for 87% of them, Cuba’s position fell within the region and for 13% it remained the same. Social indicators showed a more positive evolution. For the 14 comparable ones, there was improvement in position for 43%, 36% re- mained unchanged, and 21% decreased. With regard to the 10 non-comparable indicators, 2 out of the 3 thatmeasure school enrollmentin 2007 — secondary and higher education — probably improved their rank- ing, while for primary school enrollment the rank probably decreased. Out of 5 indicators that measure morbidity, 3 diseases were eradicated in the region in 2007, so Cuba maintained its position in malaria and probably improved it in poliomyelitis and diphtheria; Cuba was 1st and 2nd, respectively, regarding scarlet fe- ver and typhoid in 1958, so there should be no signifi- cant change by 2008. Cuba ranked last in the region in both mobile telephone use and internet access in 2005. Taking into account these inferences, the final distri- bution of the social indicators would be: 46% im- proved, 27% remained roughly unchanged, and 27% declined.

It should be noted that the fall in rankings regarding the economic indicators is quite remarkable: the arith- metic mean of the 15 indicators in 1953–1958 is 4.5, while in 2005–2007 it is 10.3. In contrast, change in the 18 social indicators is considerably less: the 1953–

To arrive at more robust conclusions would require additional indicators, especially in the external sector of the economy, as well as filling holes in various social indicators and developing techniques to measure the purchasing power of income and the quality of social services.

Although exploratory, this essay has shown that in the past fifty years, Cuba suffered severe economic deterio- ration (particularly domestic, which in turn affected the external sector), accentuated during the Special Pe- riod. With regards to social indicators: based on the figures in Table 3, the great majority of them im- proved, but in 2008, half still had not recovered their 1989 level. Turning to regional rankings (Table 4), with respect to almost half of the indicators, Cuba im- proved its position while it stagnated or worsened with respect to the other half. To improve the dismally poor economic performance of five decades, it is essential to advance in the structural reforms announced by Raúl Castro, recommended by Cuban economists, and cur- rently at a standstill, while the beneficial but costly so- cial services should be made financially sustainable in the long-term.

#### **Structural reforms now – solves stability**

RT 10/23, (“Cuba hopes abandoning two-currency system will boost economy”, <http://rt.com/business/cuba-two-currency-system-economy-579/>)

President Raul Castro has announced Cuba will no longer use the two currency financial system the country has relied on since 1994, which has long been unpopular with ordinary Cubans.

For nearly a decade Cuba has employed a two-tier system with national pesos and convertible pesos. Convertible pesos (CUC), which are more valuable, were only permitted to be used in the tourism industry and in foreign trade dealings. It will now be slowly combined with the national pesos (CUP) in a strategy that aims to curb the vast inequality that has plagued Cuba since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The mostly state-run economy adopted the two currency system as a safeguard to protect Cuba’s financial sector from any danger that would come with the sudden adoption of capitalism. Yet the policy inadvertently ushered Cubans who work in the tourism industry into relative wealth and the rest of the nation into stark lower class conditions.

Combining the two currencies is expected to raise pay for local workers and eliminate a major hurdle for importers and exporters. State newspaper Granma announced Tuesday the “measures that will lead to monetary and exchange unification.”

“(Unification) is imperative to guarantee the reestablishment of the Cuban peso’s value and its role as money that is as a unit of accounting means of payment and savings,” the statement said.

“The main changes in this first phase will be in the business sector to foster conditions that will lead to increased efficiency, better measurement of performance and the stimulation of sectors that produce goods and services for export and the substitution of imports.”

Cuban economists who spoke to Reuters said the process is expected to take 18 months and may revalue the peso along with devaluing the CUC. The government promised to give citizens time to convert their finances.

Economist Juan Triana at Harvard University’s Center for Cuban Economic Studies expressed hope, but pressed the government to provide more details in the face of such a complex initiative.

### 1AR – LNG

#### Terrorists won’t attack LNG tankers – no incentive.

Richard Farrell, Summer 2007, analyst for Chamber Corporation, “Maritime Terrorism,” *Naval War College Review*, Vol 60 No 3, EBSCO

A recent study by the ioMosaic Corporation draws upon field measurements, operational information, and engineering information on LNG vessels gathered over the last sixty years."' It takes into account terrorism and other twenty-first- century threats. The overall conclusion is straightforward—that in the highly unlikely event of a very large scale release of liquified natural gas on land or water, significant effects will be felt in the immediate vicinity.'"50 However, the zone of impact would not extend anywhere close to the thirty miles predicted by some groups." As long as an LNG vapor cloud is unconfined, it will not explode. A cloud reaching a populated area would quickly find an ignition source and burn back to the spill site before it could cover large numbers of people. If inflicting mass casualties is the terrorist goal, LNG facilities and tankers are not good targets. CONTINUED. TEXT OMITTED. THIS IS FOOTNOTE 50. 50 According to Kalelkar et al. (p. 4), available data and explosion dynamics indicate that it is not possible to detonate LNG vapors, even with an explosive charge on a storage tank, unless the LNG vapors contain high fractions of ethane and propane (more than 20 per- cent). They claim that the likelihood of this scenario is equivalent to winning the Powerball or Megabucks lottery several times simultaneously. For impact, p. 22

### 1AR – Terrorism – A2 – Bioterrorism

No risk of bioterror – and no impact

Keller 13 (Rebecca, 7 March 2013, Analyst at Stratfor, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,” Stratfor, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)

The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.

#### Best empirics

Gregg Easterbrook, senior fellow at The New Republic, July 2003, Wired, “We’re All Gonna Die!” http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic\_set=

3. Germ warfare!Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn’t kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today’s Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.

### 1AR – Demo

#### Democratization doesn’t solve war

Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs – Georgetown University, April ‘11

(Charles A, “Enmity into Amity: How Peace Breaks Out,” <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07977.pdf>)

Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, democracy is not a necessary condition for stable peace. Although liberal democracies appear to be better equipped to fashion zones of peace due to their readiness to institu­tionalize strategic restraint and their more open societies – an attribute that advantages societal integration and narrative/identity change – regime type is a poor predic­tor of the potential for enemies to become friends. The Concert of Europe was divided between two liberalizing countries (Britain and France) and three absolute monar­chies (Russia, Prussia, and Austria), but nevertheless pre­served peace in Europe for almost four decades. Gen-eral Suharto was a repressive leader at home, but after taking power in 1966 he nonetheless guided Indonesia toward peace with Malaysia and played a leading role in the founding of ASEAN. Brazil and Argentina embarked down the path to peace in 1979 – when both countries were ruled by military juntas. These findings indicate that non-democracies can be reliable partners in peace and make clear that the United States, the EU, and de­mocracies around the world should choose enemies and friends on the basis of other states’ foreign policy behav-ior, not the nature of their domestic institutions.

## 2NC – Overview

#### OFAC has broad discretionary authority to act without public notice — the counterplan solves the case but avoids international credible fallout – means the appeasement DA is sufficient

Chin 8 — Tracy J. Chin, Law Clerk to the Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, J.D. Candidate at the New York University School of Law, 2008 (“An Unfree Trade in Ideas: How OFAC’s Regulations Restrain First Amendment Rights,” *New York University Law Review* (83 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1883), Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

No standards govern OFAC's decision to create, end, or modify its general publishing licenses. OFAC can add additional exceptions [\*1900] to its general license at any time, n97 without public participation, since the agency is not subject to the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act. n98 At present, the general license for publication activities has only been added for four of the embargo programs OFAC runs: Sudan, Iran, Cuba, and Burma. n99 Nothing forecloses OFAC from removing the general license from these sanctions programs, and nothing compels OFAC to extend general license provisions to other embargo programs. n100 Currently, there are no protections for publishing activities under any of the other country-based programs, so if OFAC wished to apply a different standard of evaluating activities ordinary and incidental to publishing in, for example, its North Korean sanctions program, n101 it could do so. n102¶ OFAC also has complete discretion over granting or rejecting a specific-license application. OFAC officials' determinations are "guided by U.S. foreign policy and national security concerns." n103 License denials constitute "final agency action," n104 and there is no formal appeals process; OFAC merely assures applicants whose licenses are denied that it will reconsider its decisions for "good cause." n105¶ There is no form for requesting a specific license, and each country's program has different requirements. n106 While OFAC does make available interpretative guidance letters, it cautions against reliance on these letters, since it reserves the right to change its interpretations [\*1901] of its own regulations without any public notice. n107 In addition, these letters are reactive and fact-specific. Instead, OFAC advises that the best way to ensure compliance with the licensing scheme is to contact OFAC directly and seek the opinion of an OFAC official. n108¶ As the foregoing discussion illustrates, OFAC's specific-licensing requirement for government officials places standardless discretion in the hands of OFAC officials. Little guidance exists as to what a license application entails or what its outcome will be: OFAC itself encourages guidance on permitted and prohibited activities through informal telephone calls, there exists no specific form for license applications, and OFAC has never specified the information an applicant should provide in order to receive a license.

## 2NC – Perm do Both

#### Permanent removal turns the aff—rolls back liberalization and reforms.

Jorge A. Sanguinetty's President at Development Research Center¶ President & CEO at DevTech Systems, Inc.¶ Past¶ Director, Latin American Program in Applied Economics at American University, April, 2013 “Who benefits and loses if the US-Cuba embargo is lifted?” <http://devresearchcenter.org/2013/04/08/who-benefits-and-loses-if-the-us-cuba-embargo-is-lifted-by-jorge-a-sanguinetty/>

Who benefits and loses if the US-Cuba embargo is lifted? The answer depends on the conditions under which the embargo is lifted. I focus on the expected distribution of benefits (and costs) between the government and the Cuban population. A unilateral move by the US Government, without any quid pro quo by the Cuban government can be expected to yield significant benefits to the official establishment with benefits of an unknown magnitude to the population at large. I posit that the magnitude of the latter depends on the degree of internal liberalization of the Cuban economy. Until Raul Castro took over, the centralized command of the Cuban economy was subject to a set or constraints arguably more restrictive than the US embargo. What I have called the internal embargo consisted in the Cuban government outright prohibition for Cubans to own enterprises, freely employ workers or trade domestically and internationally. To many Cubans, probably a majority, such constraints were the main cause of the country ´s secular economic crisis.¶ Lifting the US embargo under such circumstances was reasonably expected to yield most of the economic and political benefits to the Cuban government and limited economic and no political benefits to the population. With the recent partial economic (not political) liberalization policies implemented by Raul Castro, we can expect that the distribution of economic benefits would be more favorable to the Cuban people. Such new economic freedoms carry a dose of informal political freedoms as Cubans are able to develop relationships among themselves that were tightly constrained until recently, like freedom of assembly, to communicate, and to make transactions and agreements without the tutelage of the government. To wit, as the private sector develops because the government is forced to reduce the inflated payrolls of its enterprises, the authorities lose control on those newly liberated workers.¶ Nonetheless, the system might have reached a point of equilibrium under which an unconditional lifting of the US embargo might still accrue enough economic benefit to the Cuban government that it leads to a roll back of some recent reforms in order to cut loses in the political, albeit informal, arena. This will be a strong reason to oppose an unconditional lifting on the embargo for those who care about the wishes for freedom and welfare of the Cuban people. Many international observers oppose the US embargo on the basis of several debatable assumptions. One is the belief that the embargo has served the Castro government as an excuse for its economic failures, and once lifted the excuse will disappear. Another assumption is that Cubans don´t know that the embargo might have constrained their economy, but not as much as the restrictions of virtually all economic activity by the Cuban government. There are also many Cubans that believe that the US embargo is the only leverage left to pressure the Cuban government to lift internal restrictions in both the economic and the political fronts. It is doubtful that, under the current conditions, a non-negotiated lifting of the US embargo is likely to bring about democracy in Cuba.

## 2NC – Perm do the Counterplan

#### Mutually exclusive — licensing authority and enforcement discretion are distinct mechanisms from sanctions repeal.

#### Severs USFG – Voting issue for fairness and education

#### The counterplan *exempts* but doesn’t *lift* — sanctions are still in place. This is a meaningful difference.

Amnesty 13 — Amnesty International, 2013 (“Somalia: UN arms embargo must stay in place,” March 4th, Available Online at http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/somalia-un-arms-embargo-must-stay-place-2013-03-04, Accessed 07-19-2013)

It is premature for the UN Security Council to consider lifting an arms embargo on Somalia later this week, Amnesty International said as it warned such a move could see armed groups such as al-Shabab getting its hands on even more weapons, while removing existing mechanisms of transparency and accountability.¶ Despite improvements in security in some areas of the country, including in Mogadishu, civilians still face a high risk of being killed or injured during outbreaks of fighting, in air strikes, mortar shelling or through the use of suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices. ¶ “Without adequate safeguards, arms transfers may expose Somali civilians to even greater risk and worsen the humanitarian situation,” said Gemma Davies, Amnesty International’s Somalia researcher. ¶ “For several years, the arms embargo on Somalia has been continuously violated with arms supplied to armed groups on all sides of the conflict. The flow of arms to Somalia has fuelled serious human rights abuses committed during the conflict.” ¶ The widespread availability of arms in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia continues to lead to greater insecurity for civilians. ¶ During a recent Security Council debate on Somalia, Fowsiyo Yusuf Haji Adan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Government urged both financial and military support to consolidate peace and to help hold areas recovered from the control of armed groups. ¶ Adan also requested the lifting of the arms embargo, stating her government’s intention of putting in place “the necessary mechanisms to ensure that armaments do not fall into the wrong hands”. ¶ Although this intention is welcome, Amnesty International believes that such mechanisms should be implemented first and that the Security Council should only proceed with the lifting of the arms embargo once they prove effective.¶ “Instead of lifting the embargo, it should be strengthened by incorporating strict rules granting exemptions to prevent arns from getting into the wrong hands and being used to commit human rights and humanitarian abuses.”

#### The counterplan keeps sanctions on the books—it’s competitive.

Steven Lee Myers Public Policy Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Affiliation: Diplomatic Correspondent, Washington Bureau, The New York Times, 6-30-2013 “U.S. Companies Investing in Myanmar Must Show Steps to Respect Human Rights” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/world/asia/us-companies-investing-in-myanmar-must-show-steps-to-respect-human-rights.html?pagewanted=all>

Mr. Obama has welcomed the initial steps to loosen the military dictatorship and met Mr. Thein Sein in the White House in May, but the sanction laws remain on the books and can be reinstated if the reforms are reversed. The president used his authority to waive the sanctions and grant companies licenses to operate there. The State Department then spent months drafting the requirements after holding public hearings and inviting comments from companies and advocates.

#### “*Lift*” requires Congressional action — links to appeasement

Toronto Star 10 — Toronto Star, 2010 (“Mr. Obama won’t go to Havana — at least, not anytime soon,” Byline Oakland Ross, July 9th, Available Online at http://www.thestar.com/news/insight/2010/07/09/mr\_obama\_wont\_go\_to\_havana\_at\_least\_not\_anytime\_soon.html, Accessed 07-19-2013)

After all, lifting the embargo would require an act of Congress, not a likely prospect amid Washington’s stormy partisan climate.

#### “*Lift*” requires Congress *and* the President to act — means it kills cred

FAS 8 — Federation of American Scientists Office of Global Analysis and U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2008 (“Cuba’s Food & Agriculture Situation Report,” March, Available Online at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/cuba/cubasituation0308.pdf, Accessed 07-19-2013)

The Post-Soviet Era and U.S. Policy. In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, the U.S. government implemented a number of legislations affecting U.S. policy toward Cuba. In political or administrative terms, the most significant change may be the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (the Libertad Act, or the Helms–Burton legislation). One particularly important provision of this legislation codified the U.S. embargo into law. Before this, the embargo had been an executive order that could have been lifted by any U.S. President. Now lifting the embargo requires both congressional and presidential approval.

#### In the context of embargos, “lift” means to remove or rescind.

Free Dictionary, 2013 [www.thefreedictionary.com/lift](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/lift)

lift (lft)v. lift·ed, lift·ing, lifts

v.tr.1.

a. To direct or carry from a lower to a higher position; raise: lift one's eyes; lifted the suitcase.¶ b. To transport by air: The helicopter lifted the entire team to the meet.¶ 2.¶ a. To revoke by taking back; rescind: lifted the embargo.¶ b. To bring an end to (a blockade or siege) by removing forces.¶ 3. To cease (artillery fire) in an area.¶ 4.¶ a. To raise in condition, rank, or esteem.¶ b. To uplift; elate: Your telephone call really lifted my spirits.¶ 5. To remove (plants) from the ground for transplanting.¶ 6. To project or sound in loud, clear tones: lifted their voices in song.¶ 7. Informal To steal; pilfer: A thief lifted my wallet.¶ 8. Informal To copy from something already published; plagiarize: lifted whole paragraphs from the encyclopedia.¶ 9. To pay off or clear (a debt or mortgage, for example).¶ 10. To perform cosmetic surgery on (the face, for example), especially in order to remove wrinkles or sagging skin.¶ 11.¶ a. Sports To hit (a golf ball) very high into the air.¶ b. To pick up (a golf ball) to place it in a better lie.¶ c. To shoot or flip (a puck) so that it rises sharply off the ice.

#### Lift means to remove or end

Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, 2013 <http://oald8.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/dictionary/lift>

lift

verb

raise

1 [transitive, intransitive] to raise somebody/something or be raised to a higher position or levellift somebody/something (up) (+ adverb/preposition) He stood there with his arms lifted above his head.I lifted the lid of the box and peered in. (figurative) John lifted his eyes (= looked up) from his book.lift (up) Her eyebrows lifted. ‘Apologize? Why?’¶ move somebody/something¶ 2 [transitive] lift somebody/something (+ adverb/preposition) to take hold of somebody/something and move them/it to a different positionI lifted the baby out of the chair.He lifted the suitcase down from the rack.3 [transitive] lift somebody/something (+ adverb/preposition) to transport people or things by airThe survivors were lifted to safety by helicopter. see also airlift ¶ remove law/rule¶ 4 [transitive] lift something to remove or end restrictions to lift a ban/curfew/blockade ¶ Martial law has now been lifted.

## 2NC – Disad

#### Appeasement will always fail with Cuba and Venezuela

Ros-Lehtinen 13 Chairman Emeritus of the House Foreign Affairs [Ileana, “Failed Policies in LatAm Emboldens Rogue Regimes”, January 16th of 2013, <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/opinion/2013/01/16/ileana-ros-lehtinen-failed-policies-in-latam-emboldens-rogue-regimes/>]

The administration’s approach of appeasement and engagement with brutal dictatorships in Cuba and Venezuela has only emboldened their abuse and suppression of democracy and human rights. In Cuba, the administration has eased restrictions on travel and remittances as political detentions by the Castro’s forces dramatically rose in 2012 and will likely increase again in 2013. The Castro regime’s thugs have taken it a step further by brutally beating members of human rights opposition groups like the Ladies in White, and subjecting political prisoners to the most inhumane and unsanitary conditions imaginable. These savage tactics have been the same playbook for Fidel’s protégé in Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, where human rights and freedom of speech are under siege. For example, a constitutional crisis has ensued due to Chávez remaining in a Cuban hospital and unable to attend the inauguration on January 10 as mandated by the Venezuelan Constitution. The administration should seize this opportunity to demand freedom and transparency for the Venezuelan people, and not succumb to Chávez’s ploys to maintain power. It would be naïve to think that engaging a Chavista regime that openly facilitates the illicit narcotics trade, assists the Iranian and Syrian regimes and is a gross human rights violator will yield positive results. Another extremely troubling issue has been the administration’s failure to adequately address Iran’s expansion into the Western Hemisphere. Over the last few years Tehran has increased its subversive actions and diplomatic and economic relations with radical regimes in Latin America. Last year, Ahmadinejad made two visits to the region in an attempt to gain support from like-minded tyrants, such as the Castros in Cuba, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Correa in Ecuador, Chávez in Venezuela, and Evo Morales in Bolivia. The administration has failed to produce sensible, effective policies to counter Iran’s influence in Latin America. We cannot allow the Iranian regime to parade around the region in direct defiance of responsible democracies in the region, exporting hate and violence to the brutal tyrannies of Venezuela, Cuba, and others in the region who seeks to subvert American ideals and suppress their populations. However, these actions, or inactions, are not limited to a few countries in the region. In Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia, the administration has extended the proverbial olive branch only to see no forthcoming changes in these establishment’s repressive and coercive policies. The harsh truth is that these despots would do anything to maintain their grip on power and will use any means at their disposal to do so. The administration must finally see the truth that these regimes will continue their nefarious ways as long as President Obama and his advisors fail to stand up to these dictators. These failures by the administration will not stay in the Western Hemisphere. For every brutal act President Obama ignores, for every human right that is denied, the rest of the world will be watching and taking note. The failure to address these very real issues in our region will only embolden regimes elsewhere and diminish our standing abroad. It is our duty to provide strong leadership that will support our allies, defend our interests, and ensure that human rights and freedom are being respected. These goals can only be achieved through true democratic reforms and responsible rule of law and not through the appeasement of sadistic power-hungry tyrants who have held their nations hostage for so long.

#### Appeasement makes all of their impacts more likely

Chapin and Hanson 9 (Bernard - interviewer and Victor Davis - Martin and Illie Anderson senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Change, weakness, disaster, p. http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/)

BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

#### Turns terror – the aff is a concession

James **Phillips 6**, Frmr Research Fellow at the CRS. Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at Council for Foreign Policy Studies. Bachelor’s in IR from Brown and Master’s in International Security Studies at Tufts, “The Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat,” 17 March 2006, http://www.heritage.org/research/homelandsecurity/hl928.cfm

Al-Qaeda's core group is disciplined, relentless, and fanatical and probably cannot be deterred to any significant degree. They undoubtedly will continue to launch their attacks until they are killed, captured, and decisively defeated. Bin Laden's top lieutenants are cold and rational plotters who will persevere in their efforts despite long periods of adverse conditions because of their strong belief in their eventual triumph. The lust for "martyrdom" that permeates the middle and lower levels of al-Qaeda make those terrorists difficult to deter. Individual suicide bombers, once clasped tightly in al-Qaeda's embrace and brainwashed by a tight circle of zealous associates, are unlikely to be deterred from carrying out their lethal plots. It is easier to discourage potential recruits from joining al-Qaeda than to stop them from attacking once they have been indoctrinated and prepared for what they are persuaded is religious martyrdom. To deter someone from joining, it would be helpful to convince them beforehand that al-Qaeda is fighting a losing battle, that it hurts the Muslim community by its ruthless tactics, and that its long-term goals are unrealistic and even run counter to the interests of most Muslims. The United States can influence perceptions of al-Qaeda's prospects for success by relentlessly hunting down its members and bringing them to justice. But it must rely on Muslim political and religious leaders to drive home the other points. Close cooperation with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of Muslim governments also can help discourage potential recruits from joining by underscoring that they will face counteraction not just from the United States, but from many other governments. Visible progress in defeating al-Qaeda's forces in Iraq, especially if Sunni nationalist insurgent groups can be turned against al-Qaeda, would go far to deterring young Muslim militants from joining al-Qaeda. Fewer people would want to die in a losing jihad than in one that appears to be on track to victory. As bin Laden himself noted in a candid videotape captured in Afghanistan in late 2001, "When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like the strong horse." The sooner the war in Iraq is turned over to the Iraqi government, the better for the broader war on terrorism. The stream of non-Iraqi recruits attracted to Iraq would diminish over time if potential recruits realized that their primary opponent there is not an army of infidels, but a democratic Iraqi government supported by the majority of Iraq's Sunni Arabs. Another important goal is to deter states from assisting al-Qaeda. The Bush Doctrine, enunciated in the President's September 20, 2001, speech before Congress, warned that "any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." This tough stance led Pakistan to break with al-Qaeda and Afghanistan's Taliban regime, which it previously had cooperated with against India. The United States also accrued considerable deterrent credibility by subsequent military campaigns that successfully overthrew regimes that harbored terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq. The demonstration effect of these military campaigns influenced Libya to surrender its WMD and disavow terrorism. And Iran suddenly became very cooperative in freezing its uranium enrichment program in 2003. But the strength of deterrence against Iran apparently has been undermined by the growing Iranian perception that the United States is bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, the U.S. and its allies can deter al-Qaeda terrorists by refusing to give in to their demands. Making concessions under the threat of terrorist attacks only rewards and emboldens terrorists and encourages future attacks. In the long run, suicide bombers will claim fewer victims if the targeted countries stand firm and refuse to appease them.

#### **Turns democracy**

Arias-King 8 – Fredo Arias-King, founder of the academic quarterly Demokratizatsiaya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, analyst with two regional think tanks: CEON (Miami) and CADAL(Buenos Aires), June 20, 2008, “Latin America and European ‘Soft Power’ Geopolitics,” Documentos, Year VI, No. 86, online: http://www.cadal.org/pdf/download.asp?id\_nota=2399

Cuba to the rescue? Para

doxically, but quite realistically, Cuba could become a source of inspiration for Latin America. But instead of inspiring misguided Rousseauean romantics, corrupt demagogues and guerrillas, this time the island nation could give hope to those forces attempting to reform the hemisphere. It could also be the main conduit of European soft power into the rest of the region. So far, only Chile has provided (albeit reluctantly) a model for the reformist forces of the region. Costa Rica is also oftentimes touted as an example of a socially sensitive democracy—although it’s still basically poor. All the other examples are too deeply flawed to offer any kind of model. Cuba could use its pending transition from communism to escape the cultural pathologies of latinoamericanismo, just as several other nations did with the even more pernicious ‘Central Europeanism’ of interethnic conflict, militarism, poverty and war. The only democracy east of Switzerland in the interwar period was Tomáš Masaryk’s Czechoslovakia. However, today there are over a dozen functioning democracies in the region—countries that took advantage of good leadership and a social consensus to dramatically reinvent themselves. The transition from communism provides this opportunity, if the elites take advantage of what Leszek Balcerowicz calls the ‘window of opportunity’, before the honeymoon of extraordinary politics gives way to the restraining humdrum of ordinary politics. If a post-authoritarian Cuba decides to go further than a mediocre status-quo antetransition and finds the courage to model itself as a Caribbean Estonia, then the implications for the rest of the hemisphere will be profound. A Cuba with a Havel or a Mart Laar as president, that implements administrative reform, lustration, a flat tax, open trade, rigorous banking reforms, fiscal discipline, low indebtedness, property rights and fair privatisation, that maybe even joins NATOas a way to reform its bloated military—this Cuba could see Asian-style growth rates and a dramatically better rank in the UN’s Human Development Index